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CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE "DANGEROUS" 
PATIENT: IMPLICATIONS OF TARASOFF FOR 
PSYCHIATRISTS AND LAWYERS 
by 
Vanessa Merton* 
You may find lawyers defining the range of treatments that 
you are allowed to use in specified circumstances. Lawyers 
may prescribe the criteria by which you are to choose among 
the allowable treatments. Lawyers may specify the priorities 
you must assign to different patients. Lawyers may require 
you to keep detailed records to establish at  all times that you 
are in full compliance. Lawyers may punish you unless you 
can refute beyond a reasonable doubt their presumption that 
your failures result from not following all of their regulations 
and requirements. 
The lawyers have you outnumbered, but on the average 
they are no match for you in intelligence or dedication. Just 
don't let them ambush you while you are absorbed in caring 
for the sick.** 
A. Lawyers and Doctors: The Guerrilla War Goes On 
The rancor and contempt felt by most physicians for that stock 
villain "the lawyer" has become a standard theme in the sociology 
of the professions. The epigraph above may be a gem of its kind 
* Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Senior Ad- 
junct A~sociate, The Hastings Center. A.B.,'RadclifTe College, 1971; J.D., New York Univer- 
sity School of Law, 1973. 
Much of the research for this article was done under the auspices of the National Endow- 
ment for the Humanities, through its sponsorship of the Postdoctoral Fellowship Program 
at  the Hastings Center Institute of Society, Ethics and Life Sciences. The Center is a super- 
lative setting for research of this sort, not so much because of its (relatively modest) re- 
sources, but because of the extraordinary people who are associated with it. Jonas Robit- 
scher was one of the original Fellows of the Hastings Center and until his death was a 
regular and valued participant in its work. The loss of his support and friendship is keenly 
felt by a l l  at  the Center. See 11 HASTINGS CENTER EPORT 14 (June 1981). 
** Commencement Address by Chancellor W. Allen Wallis, University of Rochester 
School of Medicine and Dentistry, quoted in Schwartz, Will Medicine Be Strangled in the 
Law? N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1975, at 35, col. 2. 
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and perhaps atypically vehement, but the intensity of feeling it 
captures is not exaggerated. The atmosphere encountered by law- 
yers who venture into the health-care setting in a professional ca- 
pacity is much like that in a village controlled by indigenous forces 
when the government troops drop by.' 
For a lawyer to ask why such antipathy exists would be disingen- 
uous; the reasons are legion, many of them valid, some no doubt 
misinformed. Lawyers may be able to refute them, but to what 
end? We are dealing not, or not solely, with the sort of cognitive 
A number of lawyers over the past decade have participated in the health-care system 
in a different way and for different reasons than ever before. Neither hospital counsel nor 
health-care administrators, not adversarial or representative in the usual sense, these law- 
yers do not engage in institutional management, patient protection, or staff defense. In- 
stead, their role is advisory, educational, and supportive; their objective is to work with 
health-care providers as members of the health-care team. As is true of the "ethicists" who 
also have become integral to the operation of several hospitals, see Kahn, Philosophers 
Prime Physicians for Ethical Dilemmas, HOSPITALS, Sept. 16, 1982, a t  162; Lippert, The 
Medical Philosophers, 14 HWTH 12 (1982); Hospitals Turning to Philosophers for Advice 
on Life-and-Death Decisions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1982, a t  Al, col. 3, this new breed of 
hospital based lawyer has been brought into the institution initially via the academic super- 
structure found in most major medical centers. While these lawyers do a good bit of teach- 
ing and lecturing, they also go on rounds, sit in on "morning report," participate in mortal- 
ity and morbidity conferences, join institutional review boards, and consult with troubled 
health-care providers on individual cases. Their mission is not to "define . . . prescribe. . . 
specify. . . require. . . and punish," as Chancellor Wallis put it, but rather to enable health- 
care providers to deliver the beet services possible. Their professional responsibility is first 
to the health-care personnel with whom they work, and ultimately to the patients for whose 
benefit all work. They are, in Geoffrey Hazard's classic phrase, "lawyers for the situation." 
See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58 (1978). 
Very gradually, despite considerable resistance, these lawyers seems to be making inroads 
on the physician's stereotyped image of the mercenary attorney. Clinicians are discovering 
that these lawyers, who themselves often have had clients, can understand what it is to 
struggle with difficult decisions under constraint of limited time and resources and inade- 
quate information. Some genuine progress towards acknowledging the problems and values 
common to both professions has been made. It is thii kind of exchange and shared experi- 
ence which might eventually alter the attitudes of health-care professionals toward lawyers 
and the law. 
Not to be unduly optimistic: most of this has been happening on "soft money"-special 
grants from government agencies or private foundations. These funds are evaporating and it 
is not at all clear that as a class these programs have generated sufficient enthusiasm to 
insure their survival. A few may survive, with correspondingly minimal impact on the 
deeply-rooted distrust of lawyers still epidemic in the medical sphere. The typical encounter 
of lawyer and physician, other than as patient or as client, is likely to remain a bristling 
bout of barely suppressed hostility and suspicion in which each takes more or less disguised 
delight in surpassing the other's jargon. 
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belief that is subject to modification by skillful persuasion and bet- 
ter evidence. We are dealing with what both street parlance and 
social science would deem an "attitude," a view of the world which 
has crystallized from an amalgam of experience, psychological 
need, and plausible folklore. One indication of this is that physi- 
cians' ire seems to focus in personal terms on lawyers, rather than 
on the abstract obduracy of our complex legal system and its tedi- . 
ous processes. 
As every lawyer who has ever tried a case to a jury should know 
even without benefit of the technical literature on attitude forma- 
t i ~ n , ~  changing someone's attitude requires more than verbal facil- 
ity and sound argument. An article such as this one, in the highly 
unlikely event that it is read by a practicing clinician, cannot be 
expected to greatly affect that clinician's attitude toward lawyers. 
(The clinician who reads this piece probably would be an unusually 
benign specimen to begin with). What an article like this can try to 
do is trace the connection between a particular recent development 
of the law, one which most clinicians consider stupid and unfair, 
and their own previous actions. The point is not to avoid blame 
but to help clinicians appreciate just how much control they can 
exercise over their legal destinies through the medium of profes- 
sional self-regulation. 
This essay examines the role conflict of the professional whose 
patient or client may be "dangerous" to others, and the ways in 
which professional standards of ethics and practice, incorporated 
by judicial ruling, contribute to that role conflict. The paper's fo- 
cus is on the plight of the psychiatrist: but it also addresses the 
strain felt by the lawyer who either represents such a client or is 
asked to advise a psychiatrist who has such a patient. It suggests 
that health-care providers are not altogether justified in assigning 
' See, e.g., Zibardo, The Tactics and Ethics of Persuasion, in AT~ITWES, CONFLICT 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 81 (1972). 
a Jonas Robitscher correctly maintained that the word "psychiatrist" often should be 
read to denote an may  of practitioners-not only physicians, clinical psychologists, and 
psychoanalysts, but also the "social workers, registered nurses, counselors, pastoral counsel- 
ors, ex-addicts and ex-alcoholics and other indigenous workers, and a large category we term 
'mental health technicians' who in some settings . . . enjoy psychiatric authority and . . . 
make psychiatric decisions!' J. ROBITSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 8 (1980). 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  3 1  Emory L. J. 265 1982 
266 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31 
sole responsibility for some of their professional difficulties to the 
law's incursions on clinical autonomy. Contrary to the assertions of 
Chancellor Wallis, the criteria by which the law evaluates the con- 
duct of medical professionals continue almost exclusively to be de- 
fined by the self-set standards of customary and prudent practice, 
and that state of affairs is unlikely to change.' For so long as it 
' See generally A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW (2d ed. 1978); W. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OP THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 
299A (1965); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (later case service 1979 & Supp. 1982) (overwhelming 
weight of authority supports view that expert evidence to support malpractice action is es- 
sential). Despite the protests of those who find anomalous the medical profession's ability to 
define unilaterally its legal and ethical responsibilities, see, e.g., R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS 82-107 (1981), very few courts have imposed an "objective," nonprofession- 
ally defined, standard of care on physicians, and then only with regard to the nontechnical 
issue of informed consent. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (physician must disclose all risks a reasonable person would consider, 
as opposed to what other physicians would consider, significant). But see Note on the After- 
math of Canterbury in the District of Columbia, in LAW AND MEDICINE: CASES AND MATERI- 
ALS 202-03 (D. Sharpe, S. Fiscina, & M. Head eds. 1978) (explaining why Canterbury may 
not be good law even in the District of Columbia). See also Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 
285,611 P.2d 902,165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980) (physicians have a duty to advise patients of all 
material risks of refusal to undergo recommended diagnostic tests; material risks are those 
that physicians know or should know would be regarded by a reasonably prudent person as 
significant) (relying on Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,502 P.2d 1,104 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1972)); 
Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 367 A.2d 525 (1976) (physician's duty to disclose may be 
determined by nonprofessional standard if trial court decides specific facts of case justify 
failure to present expert opinion); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 1977) (phy- 
sician can be held liable for failure to disclose risks according to jury standard, without 
reference to established custom of medical community); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 
260,286 A.2d 647 (1971) (standard of practice in informed consent cases distinguished from 
that of normal malpractice suit, in which issue is whether physician failed to conform to 
accepted medical practice); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972) (evidence 
of professional standards on disclosure of relevant risks not required to maintain action); 
Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1084 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (traditional view in effect in most jurisdic- 
tions still is that duty is measured by professional medical standard: either custom of local 
community of physicians or what a reasonable physician would do under similar circum- 
stances). For an exhaustive state-by-state analysis of the legislative response to judicial in- 
novation in the area of informed consent, see generally Meisel & Kabruck, Informed Con- 
sent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. P I .  L. REV. 407 
(1980). 
The cases most often cited for the proposition that standards of practice are gradually 
becoming defined by legal rather than by expert medical standards are Washington deci- 
sions. See Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash.-2d 246,595 P.2d 919 (1979) (compliance with standard 
of profession of opthalmology insufficient to defeat claim of malpractice for failure to con- 
duct additional simple, inexpensive, risk-free, diagnostic tests when initial test inconclu- 
sive). Accord Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (same holding when 
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obtains, lawyers will be tempted to respond to complaints about 
unjust or unworkable standards with "Physician, heal thyself." Of 
course, the argument that clinicians can control their exposure to 
legal liability through concerted professional action is not meant to 
imply that their moral dilemmas can be as easily resolved. For 
most practitioners those questions undoubtedly are far more 
troubling. 
B. Psychiatrists and Lawyers: A More Subliminal Conflict 
Of all health-care providers, psychiatrists traditionally have been 
the least intolerant of lawyers. Despite the utter opposition of their 
philosophies-the rigid determinism of psychoanalytic theory, be- ' 
havioral science, and psychopharmacology matched by the idealis- 
tic insistence on "free will" of the law-psychiatrists and lawyers 
seem to have enjoyed an uneasy detente akin more to sibling ri- 
valry than to guerrilla war. For one reason, psychiatrists have been 
the object of relatively few malpractice actions (it is harder to 
prove negligent failure to resolve an adjustment reaction to adult 
life than careless reduction of a fractured leg) other than as the 
indemnified and defended representatives of mental health institu- 
t i o n ~ . ~  Too, lawyers and psychiatrists share a peculiar problem: 
along with their reputedly high social status and income, both re- 
ceive considerable public ridicule and ob l~quy .~  Perhaps because 
claim for failure to perform any diagnostic procedure because not indicated by professional 
standards). But see Meeks v. Marx, 15 Wash. App. 571, 550 P.2d 1158 (1976) (restricting 
Helling to its unique facts); WASH. REV. CODE 8 4.24.290 (Supp. 1975) (legislative nullifica- 
tion of the Helling +e). For a critical analysis of these decisions and for argument that 
"the law's tradition of allowing the medical profession to set its own standards of care must 
be scrupulously upheld except when those standards are patently unreasonable," see Peters, 
The Application of Reasonable Prudence to Medical Malpractice Litigation: The Precursor 
of Strict Liability? 9 L. MED. & HWTH CARE 21, 24 (Dec. 1981). 
See Fishalow, The Tort Liability of the Psychiatrist, 4 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 
& L. 191, 191 (1976), and authorities cited therein at  217 n.5. 
The shamanistic " s h r i i  and the shyster "mouthpiece" both are derided for the ar- 
bitrariness and absurdities of their doctrines. Lawyers seem almost to take a perverse de- 
light in recounting examples of the abuse heaped on them. See D. MELLINKOPP, THE CON- 
SCIENCE OF A LAWYER 1-15 (1973) for a particularly thorough collection, ranging from Jesus' 
"Woe unto you also, ye lawyers!" through Shakespeare's: "The first thing we do, let's kill all 
the lawyers," to the proverb about St. Ives: "Advocatus et non latro; Res miranda populo" 
(translated by Mellinkoff as "A lawyer and not a thief; A thing almost beyond belief"). 
Mellinkoff sums up public opinion of lawyers as follows: "Sure the law is the third oldest 
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the accelerating application of forensic psychiatry in every aspect 
of civil and criminal practice has resulted in more frequent and 
more sustained professional contact between lawyers and psychia- 
trists, however, the mutual misunderstanding characteristic of rela- 
tionships between lawyers and the generic class of health-care 
providers seems increasingly to prevail between lawyers and 
psychiatrists. 
No wonder we sorely miss Jonas Robitscher. As a master of both 
professions who succeeded in melding their respective insights into 
an integrated perspective, Dr. Robitscher was well equipped to 
identify the excesses of each. His intolerance for rigid ideology of 
profession all right, in close order after whoring and pimping." Id. a t  1. Lawyers may take 
some consolation in the fact that i t  was Adolph Hitler who said: "Every lawyer must be 
regarded as a man deficient by nature or else deformed by usage." Willig, The Bar in the 
Third Reich. 20 A.J. LEGAL HIST. 1. 1 (1976). 
 . 
For an example of community attitudes toward psychotherapy, see the extensive account 
in R. SLOVENKO & G. USDIN, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CON ~DENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICA- 
TION 44-46 (1966), discussing an illustrative comment by Vladimir Nabokov: 
Our grandsons will no doubt regard today's psychoanalysis with the same amused 
contempt as we do astrology and phrenology. I cannot conceive how anybody in 
his right mind should go to a psychoanalyst, but of course if one's mind is de- 
ranged one might try anything: after all, quacks and cranks, shamans and holy 
men, kings and hypnotists have cured people. 
Id. a t  45. 
In part such attitudes may be explained by the fact that lawyers and psychiatrist3 gener- 
ally are called upon to intervene in circumstances of intense conflict, internal or interper- 
sonal. These interventions often directly affect persons other than the client or patient in 
ways that the ministrations of other professionals do qot. Regardless of the conflict's out- 
come, the psychic distress it engenders will linger. Psychologists tell us that distress can 
foster the need to attribute blame to someone else-a means of feeling able to control and 
avert further distress. Of those involved in the conflict, the professional, who after all ie 
making a living from it, is the easiest to blame. Lawyer and psychiatrist thus may acquire a 
kind of guilt by association. See Chaikin & Darley, Victim or Perpetrator: Defensive Attri- 
bution of Responsibility and the Need for Order and Justice, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOLOGY 268 (1973) (people need to attribute blame for misfortune to something other 
than chance in order to feel in control). Fritz Heider's work on the external and internal 
determinants of perceptions of causation remains the basic model for social psychological 
analyses of the attribution of responsibility. See F. HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY F INTERPER- 
SONAL RELATIONS 79, 112-24,167-74.212-14, 246-51, 255-65 (1958). Heider points out that a 
person may be "held responsible for each effect that is in any way connected with him or 
seems in any way to belong to him" -guilt by association. Id. a t  113. For an interesting 
interpolation of the Heiderian model with theories of legal liability, see Hamilton, Who is 
Responsible? Toward A Social Psychology of Responsibility Attribution, 41 Soc. PSYCHOL- 
OGY 316 (1978). 
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any stripe, together with his critical eye, led him to diagnose the 
occasional lunacy of the law and the apparent anomie of psychiatry 
with equal candor and accuracy. Thoroughly skeptical of the 
Guttmacher-Weihofen model of a "psychiatrized" legal system in 
which judges and penal authorities would rely on the scientific as- 
sessment of "impartial" experts, Dr. Robitscher was likewise un- 
persuaded by the Szaszian claim that just about any utilization of 
psychiatric expertise in legal decision-making is inherently corrupt 
and collu~ive.~ At the same time he appreciated the partial truths 
of both positions, which he incorporated into his own more com- 
plex prescriptions. 
Jonas Robitscher saw no reason to conclude that law and psychi- 
atry, either as intellectual disciplines or as practical professions, 
are inherently incompatible. The title of his first book reflects his 
longstanding commitment to forging their rapproachement. His lu- 
cid exposition of the sources and consequences of the friction be- 
tween the two professions, I n  Pursuit of Agreement: Psychiatry 
and the Law, still stands as the exemplar of what has become an 
impressive body of literature.$ Only Dr. Robitscher's last work, 
The Powers of Psychiatry, surpasses it. In both books, Dr. Robit- 
scher reviewed the contexts in which the interaction of psychia- 
trists and lawyers has been more problematic than productive, and 
suggested several reasons: the at  times slavish adherence of lawyers 
to absolutist logic and outdated precedent; the annoyingly mutable 
See J. ROBITSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 52, 113 (1980). See also M. 
GUITMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 10-11 (1952); Szasz, Psychiatric 
Expert Testimony: Its Overt Meaning and Social Function, 20 PSYCHIATRY 313 (1957). 
a See, e.g., S.J. BRAKEL & R.S. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (rev. ed. 
1971); W. BROMBERG, THE USES OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE LAW: A CLINICAL VIEW OF FORENSIC 
PSYCHIATRY (1979); A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (1974); 
T.G. GUTHEIL & P.S. APPLEBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK F PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1982); 
M. GUITMACHER, THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN LAW (1968); S. HALLECK, LAW IN THE PRACTICE 
OF PSYCHIATRY: A HANDBOOK FOR CLINICIANS (1980); H. HUCKABEE, LAWYERS, PSYCHIATRISTS 
AND CRIMINAL LAW: COOPERATION R CHAOS? (1981); J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN, & A. DERSHO- 
WITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, P YCHIATRY AND LAW (1967); LAW AND ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF 
PSYCHIATRY (C.K. Hofling ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as LAW & ETHICS]; J.W. POLIER, THE 
RULE OF LAW AND THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY (1968); PSYCH~ATRISTS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
DIAGNOSIS AND DEBATE (R. Bonnie ed. 1977); R. SLOVENKO, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY (1973); A. 
STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANS~TION (1975); D. WEXLER, MENTAL 
HEALTH LAW: MAJOR ISSUES (1981). 
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nosology and inflated scientism of psychiatrists; and, most impor- 
tantly, the failure of both lawyers and psychiatrists to approach 
one another's work with open minds, respect, and the will to 
understand. 
A. Uncertainty and Ambivalence in Professional Work 
Like members of the other "helping professions," lawyers and 
psychiatrists elicit ambivalent responses from those they try to 
help. Resentment, mistrust, and envy often mingle with whatever 
gratitude is felt by recipients of professional service and care.e 
The ambivalence of patients and clients is mirrored in the con- 
tradictory impulses experienced by professionals when the needs of 
an individual patient or client clash with the interests of society or 
of another individual. Under a variety of titles-"divided loyal- 
ties," "double agent," "conflict of interest,"-this problem has as- 
sumed a central role in the study of professional ethics. Like the 
related issue of the inherent limitations of professional ability,1° it 
For two of the early sociological accounts of this phenomenon, see Goffman, The 
Medical Model and Mental Hospitalization: Some Notes on the Vicissitudes of the Tinker- 
ing Trades in ASYLUMS 321, 345-47, 358-59 (1961); Merton & Barber, Sociological Ambiva- 
lence, reprinted in SOCIOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (R.K. Merton ed. 1976). 
See also Toulmin, The Meaning of Professionalism: Doctors' Ethics and Biomedical Sci- 
ence in KNOWLEDGE, VALUE AND BELIEF 254,259-61 (H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. & D. Callahan eds. 
1977) (despite the title, Professor Toulmin devotes substantial portions of his analysis to the 
legal profession). Finally, see Merton, Merton, & Barber, Client Ambivalence in Profes- 
sional Relationships: The Problem of Seeking Help from Strangers, in 2 NEW DIRECTIONS 
IN HELPING (B.M. DePaulo, A. Nadler, & J.D. Fisher eds. in press). 
lo Because of the (not necessarily conscious) belief that they need, as much as technical 
prowess, the power to inspire clients and patients with trust in the practitioner and faith in 
the practice, professionals are tempted to minimize factors that might undermine that faith 
and trust. The line between appropriate reassurance and deceptive advertising is not always 
easy to negotiate. It is axiomatic, but hard to admit (either to oneself or to the patient or 
client) that the adroitly conducted cross-examination may not discredit the witness, that the 
perfectly executed surgery may not save the patient. Ironically, the quack or hack often will 
offer guaranteed results. The probabilistic nature of professional practice has been thor- 
oughly investigated only with respect to medicine, see generally H. BURSZTAJN, R. FEIN- 
BLOOM, R. HAMM, & A. BRODSKY, MEDICAL CHOICES, MEDICAL CHANCES: HOW PATIENTS, FAM- 
ILIES AND PHYSICIANS CAN COPE WITH UNCERTAINTY (1981); A. ELSTEIN, L.S. SHULMAN, & 
S.A. SPRMKA, MEDICAL PROBLEM SOLVING: AN ANALYSIS OF CLINICAL REASONING (1978), but 
the uncertainty principle clearly obtains in other professions as well. For the first systematic 
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is a difficult problem for most professionals to face. 
It seems reasonable to suggest, as many critics of the professions 
have, that in the course of gaining informed consent to treatment 
or representation, professionals ought to discuss topics such as the 
limits of their expertise and the potential for divided loyalties. An 
honest interchange in which the client's or patient's own uncon- 
scious or unspoken fears are voiced could diffuse those fears. While 
it is not easy, and not invariably appropriate, to explain to an anx- 
ious patient or client that one's very best may fail and that one's 
loyalty is subject to compromise, continuing denial of these critical 
aspects of the professional role can only exacerbate the problem. 
Paradoxically, open admission of the potential for failure and be- 
trayal may allow a deeper trust to develop in the professional 
relationship." 
sociological account of the impact of uncertainty in medical practice, see T. PARSONS, THE 
SOCIAL SYSTEM 466-69 (1951). See also C. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER: MANAGING MEDI- 
CAL FAILURE (1979); R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL (1974); ARROW, Uncertainty 
and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963); Davis, Uncer- 
tainty in Medical Prognosis, Clinical and Functional, 66 AM. J. Soc. 41 (1960); Fox, Train- 
ing for Uncertainty, in THE STUDENT-PHYSICIAN 207-41 (R.K. Merton, G. Reader, & P.C. 
Kendall eds. 1957). The best recent treatment of the perceived need to assert control over 
sources of uncertainty in professional practice is Light, Uncertainty and Control in Profes- 
sional Training, 20 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 310 (1979). 
Conscientious professionals increasingly find i t  liberating to divest themselves of their airs 
of authority and to require clients and patients to acknowledge the uncertainty inherent in 
the professional encounter, despite the difficulties such a policy can cause. The classic work 
on the difficulty of making important decisions under conditions of uncertainty is JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky eds. 
1982). In coping with the inevitable uncertainties, however, both the patient or client and 
the professional still need the comforting sensation of being in the presence of power. The 
trick is to forge a therapeutic alliance, a fiduciary compact that can create that sense of 
power and, in a positive version of the self-fulfilling prophecy, enable the work to proceed 
without the false support of an illusion of certitude. 
" See Brody, The Patient's Role in Clinical Decision-Making, 93 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 718 (1980); Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015, 
1045-46 (1981); Katz, Disclosure and Consent in Psychiatric Practice: Mission Impossible? 
in LAW & ETHICS, supra note 8, a t  91, 102-03, 115. See a k o  D. ROSENTHAL, AWYER AND 
CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE 38-61, 168-70 (2d ed. 1977) ("participatory" model of profes- 
sional-client relationship, involving client's access to complete information, initial definition 
of goals, periodic evaluation of professional's performance, and continuing communication 
with professional may result in more effective collaboration and more genuine client-profes- 
sional relationship); Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV., 307, 313-18 (1980) (full disclosure to client has positive utilitarian consequences as 
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B. Patient Welfare and Society's Protection: The Role Conflict 
of Psychiatrists 
Jonas Robitscher was among the first to describe the divided 
loyalties of psychiatrists and the need to protect patients from be- 
coming victims of the varied pressures on their  doctor^.'^ Chilling 
reports of abuses in Soviet psychiatrylS have led other knowledgea- 
ble commentators to become concerned with this problem. 
One such observer is David Bazelon, the jurist who presided over 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals during the decades of its innova- 
tive jurisprudence in the field of forensic psychiatry and mental- 
health policy." Now Senior Circuit Judge, Bazelon continues an 
unremitting campaign not only against the "perils of wizardry"16 
-undue reliance on technical expertise, psychiatric and otherwise 
well as moral implications). But see Ackerman, Why Doctors Should Intervene, 12 HAS- 
TINGS CENTER REPORT 14 (Aug. 1982) (god of restoring patient autonomy ill-served by 
mechanical application of legalistic rules such as truthtelling); Moore & Tumin, Some Social 
Functions of Ignorance, 14 AM. SOC. REV. 787 (1949) (client trust in unvarying professional 
competence and certainty of favorable outcome necessary for effective relationship). 
la  See J. ROBITSCHER, IN PURSUIT OF AGREEMENT: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 203-21 
(1966). 
la For a description of Soviet psychiatrists' use of diagnostic labels such as "reformist 
delusion" and "litigation mania" to "deprive [political dissidents] of freedom for an unlim- 
ited length of time, keep them isolated and drugged, and discredit their ideas and actions," 
see V. BUKOVSKY & S. GLUZMAN, A MANUAL ON PSYCHIATRY FO  DISSIDENTS 1,7-8 (1974). See 
generally S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, PSYCHIATRIC ERROR: HOW SOVIET PSYCHIATRY 18 USED 
TO SUPPRESS DI SENT (1977). A letter from dissident psychiatrist Anatoly Koryagin, which 
was smuggled out of the Soviet Union, indicates that world reaction to accounts of these 
practices has not deterred their continuation. Koryagin's disclosures and protests bought 
him twelve years of imprisonment and exile. See Letter from A. Koryagin, Appeal to Psy- 
chiatrists, 1981 LANCET 1121 (Nov. 14,1981). Koryagin was elected an honorary member of 
the American Psychiatric Association. 
l4 See generally I n  re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("beyond reasonable doubt" 
standard of proof of mental illness and dangerousness imposed in involuntary civil commit- 
ment proceedings); United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Durham test 
rejected in favor of A.L.I. "substantial capacity" test for insanity defense); Washington v. 
United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (expert witnesses' use of technical psychiatric 
terms limited and explanatory instructions regarding role of psychiatric witnesses required); 
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (involuntary mental patient's constitu- 
tional right to treatment upheld); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (inquiry 
into least restrictive alternative course of treatment for mental patient required); Durham v. 
United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (new test of criminal responsibility adopted 
under which accused is not responsible if act is produced by mental disease or defect). 
l6 Bazelon, The Perils of Wizardry, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1317 (1974). 
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-but also against the enlistment of psychiatrists into "service to 
the political and social status quo."ls Echoing that theme, a major 
conference, "In the Service of the State: The Psychiatrist as 
Double Agent," was cosponsored in 1977 by the American Psychi- 
atric Association and the Hastings Center.17 Dr. Seymour Halleck, 
a forensic psychiatrist and author of a handbook for clinicians on 
law and mental health, also has explored the ethical implications 
of the psychiatrist's role of "double agent."18 Dr. Alfred Freedman, 
chairman of the department of psychiatry at  New York Medical 
College and past president of the American Psychiatric Associa- 
tion, made the divided allegiance of psychiatrists the subject of his 
address to the plenary session of the First World Congress of Psy- 
chiatry. (The Congress later adopted the Declaration of Hawaii, in- 
ternational psychiatry's code of ethics.lS) The Chief of the Center 
for Studies of Crime and Delinquency at  the National Institute of 
Mental Health, Dr. Saleem Shah, has repeatedly decried the prac- 
tice of confusing therapeutic objectives with obligations of social 
control.20 
1. In and Out of the Institutional Setting 
Those who have expressed concern about the divided loyalties of 
psychiatrists intimate that clarification and differentiation of the 
psychiatrist's professional role is most urgently required in institu- 
tional settings such as hospitals, prisons, schools, and the armed 
services. The patient's ability to withdraw from the psychiatrist's 
care, which can serve to check potential abuse, is limited within 
Bazelon, The Law, The Psychiatrist and The Patient, 5 MAN & MEDICINE 77, 78 
(1980). 
l7 See In the Service of the State; The Psychiatrist As Double Agent, 8 HASTINGS 
CENTER EPORT (Special Supp. 1978). See also Callahan & Gaylin, The Psychiatrist As 
Double Agent, 4 HASTINGS CENTER EPORT 12 (1974). 
See Halleck, Privacy and Social Control in THE POLITICS OF THERAPY 119 (1971). 
See Freedman, Ethics in Psychiatry: A Question of Allegiance. 8 PSYCHIATRIC AN- 
NUS 5,14 (1978). See also WORLD PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF HAWAII (19771, 
reprinted in DICTIONARY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 138-40 (A.S. Duncan, G.R. Dunstan, & R.B. 
Welbourn eds., rev. & enlarged ed. 1981). 
See Shah, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Conceptual, Prediction and 
Policy Dilemmas, in DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH (C. 
Frederick ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Shah, Dangerousness]; Shah, Foreword to A. 
STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION at x (1975). 
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such institutions, and the independence of the psychiatrist's 
clinical judgment is likely to be compromised by a sense of respon- 
sibility to institutional goals and priorities. Ties to other profes- 
sionals and ambitions for advancement in the institutional hier- 
achy also may have significant effects. 
Concern about the pressure on psychiatrists who practice in in- 
stitutions is well founded. To some extent, that concern is shared 
by institutional administrators. In many psychiatric hospitals, 
elaborate structural arrangements have been devised to separate 
responsibility for clinical administration and ward management 
from responsibility for the therapeutic regimen. The therapist who 
works on the patient's inner conflicts does not decide whether to 
give the patient a day's pass or how to respond to the patient's 
"acting out" on the ward.21 But measures intended to insulate the 
therapeutic mission of institutions from their purpose of social 
control and societal protection can never wholly resolve the role 
conflict of psychiatrists. Patients associated with institutions con- 
stitute only a fraction of those whose behavior psychiatrists are ex- 
pected to -control. Psychiatrists in private routinely are 
called upon, and choose, to function as agents of social order and 
family authority, despite the protests of their patients. In the pro- 
cess of trying to carry out this mandate, some psychiatrists may 
experience what Bateson et al. describe as a "double bind": a situ- 
ation in which no matter what one does, one "can't win" and will 
feel that one has failed to satisfy a legitimate ~bl iga t ion .~~ 
See, e.g., R.L. COSER, TRAINING IN AMBIGUITY: LEARNING THROUGH DOING IN A 
MENTAL HOSPITAL 35-61 (1979). 
%' See Bateson, Jackson, Haley, & Weakland, Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia, re- 
printed in STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF MIND 201 (G. Bateson ed. 1972). It is important to note 
that many psychiatrists claim to feel no such conflict, or consider i t  an extremely rare occur- 
rence. To them, the responsibility of assuring that their patients do not harm themselves or 
others seems entirely commensurate with their primary professional function of helping and 
healing-indeed, i t  is identical to that function. (Whiie to therapists this may seem an obvi- 
ous point, I am indebted to Dr. Willard Gaylin, psychiatrist and President of the Hastings 
Center, for clarifying it  for me.) The position of these psychiatrists is unabashedly paternal- 
istic; that is, they will act in what they judge to be the best interests of their patients, even 
when those actions are completely contrary to their patients' express wishes. In hospitaliz- 
ing, medicating, or revealing the confidence of a patient who is disruptive on the job, prob- 
lematic for family, or dangerous to the public, such psychiatrists see themselves as advanc- 
ing, not compromising, the patient's interest. Lawyers frequently are -confused by this 
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2. An Example: The Tarasoff Problem 
A prime example of conflict between loyalty to a patient and re- 
sponsibility to others is the Tarasoff problem, so called after the 
controversial and unprecedented decision of the Supreme Court of 
California in the case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
C a l i f ~ r n i a . ~ ~  In that decision the court recognized a limited duty 
on the part of psychotherapists to protect third parties from pa- 
tients whom they consider "dangerous," if necessary by violating 
that fundamental tenet of the profession's ethic, the promise of 
confidentiality. All psychiatrists, indeed all psychotherapists of 
whatever persuasion, regardless of institutional affiliation or its ab- 
sence, are charged with this duty. Although Tarasoff arose in the 
context of an institution, there is no reason to anticipate that the 
court's holding will be confined to such situations. Subsequent 
cases involving both private and institutionally based therapists 
have not even alluded to the issue of institutional affiliation. 
Tarasoff and its progeny provide substantial grounds for the thesis 
that the professional role conflict of psychiatrists is not generated 
solely by the pressures of practice in institutions. 
The Tarasoff decision galvanized the psychiatric profession into 
efforts to educate courts and legislatures about the limits of psy- 
chiatrists' capacity to assure public safety, but these disclaimers 
have had little effect on the spread of the Tarasoff doctrine to 
other jurisdictions. Psychiatrists condemn the doctrine as yet an- 
rationale and tend to view the psychiatrist who acts in accord with i t  not as paternalistic 
but as actively preferring, to the detriment of the patient, the convenience, comfort, and 
safety of others. The conflict between lawyers and psychiatrists is often characterized as the 
clash of two commitments, one to patient autonomy and the other to patient welfare. See, 
e.g., Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 
72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461,462-63 (1978) (state has delegated psychiatrists too much naked au- 
thority; "liberty" includes the freedom to decide about one's own health; external regulation 
of modes of psychiatric treatment prevailing in state mental health hospitals an absolute 
necessity); Treffert, Letter to the Editor: Dying With Their Rights On, 130 AM. J. PSYCHU- 
TRY 1041 (1973) (persons who could not be civilly committed under revised procedures 
designed to protect constitutional rights have suffered serious injury as a result of lack of 
supervision and treatment). To  many lawyers, however, the conflict appears as one between 
patient welfare, of which autonomy is a significant but not necessarily overriding compo- 
nent, and the welfare of others, to whom the psychiatrist does not owe the same loyalty. 
Thus, lawyers and psychiatrists contrive to talk past one another. 
PS 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). 
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other unnecessary stricture inflicted on them by an uncom- 
prehending judicial system. Their anxiety and antagonism are en- 
tirely understandable. The Tarasoff ruling did not create the role 
conflict they are experiencing, however; it merely embodied and 
perhaps reinforced a conflict that has long existed. 
Tarasoff seems to have brought home to many psychiatrists the 
double-bind quality of their professional obligations. Dissolution of 
that bind will depend on more than individual response. It may 
require psychiatrists to act collectively, to develop a professional 
consensus that simply will not permit certain practices-such as 
predicting the lifelong course of a defendant's behavior a t  a sen- 
tencing proceeding. As psychiatrists generally recognize, bringing 
the dimensions of a schizophrenegenic conflict into conscious 
awareness, in and of itself, rarely is all that is needed to resolve the 
problem. 
C. Public Interest and Client Representation: The  Role Conflict 
of  Lawyers 
Lawyers too have been made painfully aware that loyalty to 
their clients often comes into conflict with the responsibilities im- 
posed on them in their role as "officers of the court." This role 
conflict is also not a byproduct of institutional affiliation or of gov- 
ernment support for legal services; it is encountered in the practice 
of every member of the profession and does not lend itself to easy 
"administrative" s~lution.~' For a lawyer, the role conflict may be 
For an early discussion of "the defense lawyer as double agent" in the context of plea 
bargaining, see Blumberg, The Practice of Law as  Confidence Game: Organizational Coop- 
tation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC'Y REV. 15,'20, 28 (1967) (analyzing the effects of "close 
and continuing relations with the prosecuting office and the court itself' on defense lawyers, 
"whether privately retained or of the legal-aid, public defender variety.") 
Legal scholars and leaders of the bar gradually have abandoned the fallacy that the pro- 
fession's ethical code, detailed and labored over as i t  mny be, can ever constitute a disposi- 
tive hierarchy of principle, an ethical algorithm that will yield the correct course of action 
for the lawyer in each particular case. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN AD- 
VERSARY SYSTEM ~ i i  (1975); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 56-57 (1978); Callan 
& David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client 
Misconduct in a n  Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 335-36 (1976); Kutak, The 
Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some Observations About the Proposed Model Rules of Profes- 
sional Conduct, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 6 (1980); Glenn, Book Review, 57 Tex. L. REV. 307, 
319 (1979) (reviewing G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978) and J. LIEBERMAN, 
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even more distressing than it is for a psychiatrist; the lawyer's 
sense of primary loyalty to the client is remarkably stronge2= It is 
CRISIS AT THE BAR: LAWYERS' UNETHICAL ETHICS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (1978)). See also 
Comment, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: Void for Vagueness? 57 N.C.L. REV. 
671 (1979); Discussion by Participants and Panel of Address of J. Ferren, The Corporate 
Lawyer's Obligation to the Public Interest, 33 Bus. LAW. 1253, 1279 (1978). 
The American Bar Association's MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinaf- 
ter cited as ABA CODE], promulgated in 1969, has been adopted in some form, albeit with 
significant deletions and modifications, by the courts or legislatures of every state and the 
District of Columbia (even California's idiosyncratic Rules of Professional Conduct bear 
substantial resemblance; see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 5 6076 Rules 1-23 (West 1974 & Supp. 
1980). Dissatisfaction with the ABA CODE'S ambiguity, inconsistency, and failure to ac- 
knowledge the conflict among the lawyer's several roles provided the impetus for the ap- 
pointment in 1977 of a blue-ribbon panel charged to undertake a "comprehensive rethinking 
of the ethical premises and problems of the profession of law." American Bar Association 
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards [hereinafter cited as Kutak Commis- 
sion], Chairman's Introduction, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT a t  i (Proposed 
Final Draft 1981) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED MODEL RULES]. The release in January, 
1980, of an entirely reworked ethical code entitled "Discussion Draft," definitely accom- 
plished its purpose of provoking debate throughout the profession. See Burt, supra note 11, 
a t  1017 n.15; see also Review Symposium: The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1980 
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 923 (1980). 
The Discussion Draft provision on the confidentiality of client communications garnered 
particularly strong reaction, and apparently prompted another professional organization, the 
American Trial Lawyers of America, to issue a rival code. See Burke, ATLA-ABA Tiff 
Looms Over Altering Ethics Code, NAT'L L.J., May 19, 1980, a t  10. See also R. POUND- 
AMERICAN TRIAL AWYER'S FOUNDATION C MMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE 
AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (Public Discussion Draft 1980) [hereinafter cited as 
ATLA CODE]. The ATLA CODE'S position on confidentiality is notably stricter than that of 
the American Bar Association both in its present Code or in its Proposed Model Rules. It 
would all but prohibit disclosure of client confidences under almost any circumstances. See 
ATLA CODE Rule 1.2-1.4 alternative B; Subin, War Over Client Confidentiality: I n  Defense 
of the Kutak Approach, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 19, 1981, a t  22-23. However, the ATLA CODE has 
received little endorsement within the profession other than from its proponents. 
The May 1981 Final Draft of the PROPOSED MODEL RULES appears to be less of a depar- 
ture from the traditional model of professional behavior, a t  least with respect to issues of 
confidentiality. (However, some critics continue to caution that Proposed Rules 1.6, 1.13, 
and 3.3 are more supportive of lawyer disclosure than they seem. Panel Presentation of 
Professor Monroe Freedman to New York City Bar Association (Apr. 14, 1982). For further 
discussion, see text accompanying note 184 infra. The American Bar Association House of 
Delegates was unable to reach a firm decision about the PROPOSED MODEL RULES a t  its Au- 
gust, 1982 convention, see Taylor, Dishonesty in Law: A New Ethics Code Is Sought, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 17, 1982, a t  A3, col. 1, and finally voted to defer further consideration. Regard- 
less of the eventual decision, complaints about the inadequacies of the bar's attempts to 
reduce its ethical precepts to writing doubtless will continue unabated. Of course, i t  is much 
easier to criticize proposed solutions than to formulate them. 
Po For an enlightening and much-cited discussion of the tensions created by lawyers' 
role-differentiated behavior, see Wasserstrom, Lawyers as  Professionals: Some Moral Is- 
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not uncommon for the lawyer to feel a genuine identification with 
the client and the client's cause, especially in a relationship of 
some duration. Even when the advocate's "warm zeal" is entirely 
feigned, the distinctive dimension of representation-of acting for 
and speaking for clients as well as to and about them-commands 
an almost irreducible residue of allegiance.2e The traditional role of 
champion, or for those who prefer less honorific terms "hired gun," 
cannot easily comport with any act of betrayal, however public- 
spirited it may be. 
Lawyers are almost obsessively preoccupied with preserving the 
sues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975). The definitive statement of the lawyer's sense of loyalty to client 
is the even more frequently cited passage from Lord Brougham's defense of Queen Caroline 
against George IV's bill for divorce in the House of Lords. It is repeated here for the sake of 
those few readers who have escaped previous exposure: 
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, 
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and 
a t  all  hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first 
and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the 
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of 
a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though 
it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion. 
2 TRIU OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821). Lord Brougham, of course, wm 
engaged a t  the time in calculated political maneuvers, not in meditation on the theme of the 
advocate's professional responsibility. For an excellent analysis of the impact of this bro- 
mide and other classics of the legal-ethics literature on contemporary thinking about the 
lawyer's role, see Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 
909 (1980). Our current Chief Justice, Warren Burger, presented an interesting and a quite 
different view of the optimal resolution of an advocate's role conflict in a concurring opinion 
written while he still sat on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeale: 
The advocate's role and duty. . . is not to "win" or set his client free, but to see 
that the case is tried and reviewed in accordance with a set of rules . . . . When 
the advocate has done that, he has done his duty. He should not be asked to do 
more and he ought not to do less. 
Johnson v. United States, 360 F.2d 844, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
This comment was preceded by the observation: 
Few courts have stated this basic ethical duty more cogently than the Supreme 
Court of Nebraska: An attorney owes his first duty to the court. He assumed his 
obligations toward i t  before he ever had a client. His oath requires him to be 
absolutely honest even though his client's interests may seem to require a contrary 
course. 
Id. a t  846 n.2 (quoting In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 289, 276 
N.W. 265,268 (1937)). The decision Justice Burger so heartily endorsed went on to declare: 
"The lawyer cannot serve two masters; and the one [he has] undertaken to serve primarily is 
the court." 133 Neb. a t  289, 275 N.W. a t  268. 
*' See Wasserstrom, supra note 25, a t  14. 
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sanctity of client communications. Perhaps that is why they are 
afforded potent protection by an attorney-client privilege in every 
jurisdiction, state and federal.27 Geoffrey Hazard, Reporter for the 
American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Profes- 
sional Standards, calls the attorney-client privilege the "pivotal el- 
ement of the modern American lawyer's professional f u n c t i ~ n . " ~ ~  Is 
i t  the fact that almost everything lawyers do involves communica- 
tion, either with clients or on behalf of clients, that makes lawyers 
so unnerved by the prospect of mandatory disclosure? In the words 
of one federal judge: 
The broad commitment of the lawyer to respect confidences 
reposed in him is his talisman. Touching the very soul of 
lawyering, it rests upon a "privilege" which is that of the cli- 
ent, not that of the lawyer. Inaccurately described as the 
"lawyer's privilege against testifying," the privilege of clients 
to bind their lawyers to secrecy is universally honored and 
enforced as productive of social values more important than 
the search for truth. Canon 4 [the ethical mandate to preserve 
client confidences] is designed to preserve the trust of the cli- 
ent in his lawyer, without which the practice of law, whatever 
else it might become, would cease to be a profes~ion.~~ 
'' See the exhaustive table of authorities in Callan & David, supra note 24, a t  338 n.31. 
For a classic definition of the elements of the privilege, see United States v. United Shoe 
Mach. Co., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). The importance of the privilege to 
"sound legal advice or advocacy" has been reatlirmed by the Supreme Court in a pair of 
recent cases, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (proper representation 
possible only when client need not apprehend disclosure); Trammel v. United States, 445 
U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (attorney-client privilege rooted in imperative need for confidence and 
trust between lawyer and client). 
Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1061, 1061 (1978). 
2e Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 
U.S. 905 (1978). See also the concurring opinion of Judge Mountain in In  re Callan, 66 N.J. 
401, 331 A.2d 612 (1975): 
In some substantial degree, the effectiveness of the representation an attorney af- 
fords his client will depend upon the quality of the relationship that exists be- 
tween them. And only if that relationship is one of utter trust and confidence on 
the part of the client will he communicate with his attorney in a completely can- 
did and uninhibited manner. Of perhaps paramount importance in inducing this 
kind of relationship and trust is a conviction on the part of the client that his 
communications will not be revealed to others. It would be difficult to exaggerate 
the importance of this factor. 
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Outsiders are scarcely sympathetic when lawyers place the pres- 
ervation of client confidences above the arguably more compelling 
interest of preventing harm to other identifiable individuals. We 
need only recall the notorious "where the bodies are buried" case.30 
To many lawyers, the refusal of Robert Garrow's attorneys to di- 
vulge his secrets, despite the plea by the father of one of Garrow's 
victims to know whether his daughter was alive or dead, was the 
only ethical choice. To most onlookers, the attorneys' behavior ap- 
peared not merely unheroic but downright inhuman.31 The even- 
tual dismissal of the indictment lodged against them32 and the bar 
association's vindication of their position33 could not have alto- 
gether assuaged the revilement they suffered. 
Lawyers have been subjected to more than criticism for failing to 
disclose confidential information about their clients. They have 
been held in contempt of court and ordered to jail:' suspended 
Id. at  408-09, 331 A.2d a t  617. 
30 See People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d 186,372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga Cty. Ct.), aff'd, 50 
A.D.2d 1088,376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1975), afd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 
N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976). See also M. FREEDMAN, supra note 24, a t  1. 
People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d a t  189,372 N.Y.S.2d a t  801 ("Public indignation reached 
a fever pitch . . . a hue and a cry went up from the press and other news media . . ."); see 
Freedman, Where the Bodies Are Buried: The Adversary System and the Obligation of 
Confidentiality, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 979,979 (1974) ("Members of the public were shocked at  
the apparent callousness of these lawyers, whose conduct was seen as typifying the un- 
healthy lack of concern of most lawyers with the public interest and with simple decency."). 
See also the catalogue of public outcry in Chamberlain, Legal Ethics, Confidentiality and 
the Case of Robert Carrow's Lawyers, 25 BUPPALO L. REV. 211, 221-22 n.64 (1975). For the 
reaction of a psychiatrist, see M. PESZKE, INVOLUNTARY REATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL
140 (1975) ("The recent case from New York State in which attorneys knew about a murder 
but did not inform the authorities and kept the parents of the murdered child in suspense is 
accepted and condoned by canon ethics, but revolting to the moral and common sense atti- 
tude of most citizens!"). Those who judged Garrow's attorneys with such severity presuma- 
bly did not ask themselves whether they would want to be represented by a lawyer whose 
loyalty was less single-minded. Somehow, i t  is usually the other fellow's lawyer who ought to 
have been more concerned about the public. 
3Z People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d a t  191, 372 N.Y.S.2d at  803. 
s3 New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 479 (1978). 
=' See, e.g., In  re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Lawson), 600 F.2d 215 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (refusal to provide names of clients to grand jury); In re January 1976 Grand 
Jury, 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976) (refusal to comply with subpoena to produce money re- 
ceived from clients suspected of bank robbery); In  re Kozlov, 156 N.J. Super. 316, 383 A.2d 
1158 (1978) (refusal to reveal name of client who was source of information about prejudiced 
juror), rev'd, 79 N.J. 232, 398 A.2d 882 (1979); In  re Callan, 122 N.J. Super. 479, 300 A.2d 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  3 1  Emory L. J. 280 1982 
19821 IMPLICATIONS OF TARASOFF 281 
from and prosecuted for aiding and abetting their cli- 
ents in violating the law.36 The courts, administrative agencies and 
disciplinary committees that imposed these penalties were un- 
moved by the argument that lawyers cannot function without the 
complete trust of their clients. Since clients are not entitled to le- 
gal assistance in the planning or commission of a crime or tort:? 
encouraging them to rely on the lawyer's fidelity in the context of 
ongoing or anticipated misconduct is seen as serving no valid pur- 
pose. However, trying to determine whether client confidences are 
in the sacrosanct category of past offenses, in which case a lawyer 
should risk incarceration to protekt or whether they consti-' 
868 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 126 N.J. Super. 103, 312 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1973), rev'd, 66 N.J. 401, 
331 A.2d 612 (1975) (failure to disclose client violation of court order); Waldmann v. Wald- 
mann, 48 Ohio St. 2d 176, 358 N.E.2d 521 (1976) (refusal to disclose client's address). See 
also State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828,394 P.2d 681 (1964) (refusal to produce 
knife allegedly used in murder by client). 
I n  re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va), aff'd per curium, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 
1967) (attorney hid proceeds of and weapons used during bank robbery); I n  re Carter, [I981 
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) U 82,847 (Feb. 28,1981) (corporate counsel failed 
to disclose fraudulent scheme of management; suspension from practice before the SEC re- 
versed because unambiguous standards of professional conduct covering their activity did 
not exist a t  time; held, prospectively, that attorneys aware of client's failure to satisfy dis- 
closure requirements must take "prompt steps"). See also In  re Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474 (Ct. 
App. Ky. 1951) (attorney suspended for failure to correct client's statement during hearing 
which attorney knew to be false). 
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682,713-15 (D.D.C. 1978) (fail- 
ure to try to prevent closing of corporate merger and to disclose to shareholders and to SEC 
confidential information received from client's auditor constitutes aiding and abetting viola- 
tion of securities laws; injunctive relief denied). For a list of other opinions filed in connec- 
tion with this much-litigated case, and reference to the lengthy bibliography it  generated, 
see Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Judicial Conference for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, 89 F.R.D. 169, 223, n.2 (1980). 
See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 
895, 909-10 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143,144 (4th Cir. 1967); 
and other authorities enumerated in PROPOSED MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 1.6, Note 
on Exceptions to Confidentiality a t  44. See generally UNW. R. E m .  502(d)(l) (1953); 
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 212 (1942); Note, The Future Crime or Tort Exception to 
Communications Privileges, 77 HARV. L. REV. 730 (1964), and authorities cited therein. 
" See People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 447, 277 P.2d 94, 101 (1954) ("Attorney 
should have chosen to go to jail and take his chances of release by a higher court."); ABA 
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 312 (unpublished) cited in Callan & David, 
supra note 24, a t  345 n.53 (attorney should refuse to disclose privileged communication 
"though the court [may] send him to jail"). See also New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on 
Professional Ethics, Op. 528 (1981) (lawyer need not comply immediately with court order 
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tute potential threats or reveal continuing wrongdoing, in which 
case a lawyer probably should report them to the appropriate au- 
t h o r i t i e ~ , ~ ~  has proven an elusive task and a perilous enterprise. 
The range and diversity of professional ethical opinion on almost 
any single issue is e~traordinary.~~ Judge Skelly Wright calls these 
to disclose client confidence which is subject to reversal or modification on appeal, even if 
faced with risk of being held in contempt). 
See ABA CODE, supra note 24, DR 7-102(B)(1) (lawyer should reveal client fraud on 
tribunal, committed in course of lawyer's representation; in some jurisdictions, not applica- 
ble if information considered a client confidence or secret); ABA Comm. on Professional 
Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 155 (1936) (lawyer should reveal future unlawful act or 
continuing wrong); ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE--THE D FENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-3.7(d) (2d 
ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS] (lawyer must reveal expressed intention of 
client to commit crime and information required to prevent crime that would seriously en- 
danger life or safety of person or corrupt processes of courts). (The ABA STANDARDS are 
purely hortatory in that they are not the law of any jurisdiction, nor are they enforced by 
the disciplinary structure of the profession.) But see ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics 
and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953) (lawyer must advise court not to rely on lawyer's 
silence to corroborate client's lack of prior criminal record, but cannot reveal client's past 
perjury); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314 (1976) 
(confidential privilege must be upheld over obligation to notify court of client's fraud on 
tribunal). 
'O For example, on the relatively discrete issue of revealing a fugitive client's wherea- 
bouts, compare ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 23 (1930) 
(no duty to disclose generally) with ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 
Formal Op. 155 (1936) (duty to disclose when client has fled jurisdiction) and ABA Comm. 
on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1141 (1970) (depending on whether fugitive seeks ad- 
vice concerning "rights" or concerning how he can "best remain a fugitive," lawyer either 
cannot disclose or, if fugitive refuses to surrender, must disclose whereabouts) and Arizona 
State Bar Comm. On Professional Ethics, Op. 65 (1960), reprinted in 6 ARIZ. BAR J. 15 
(1970) (no ethical obligation of disclosure prior to arrest) and Michigan State Bar Comm. on 
Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 163 (1954), reprinted in 38 MICH. BAR J. 216 (1969) 
(no duty to disclose generally) and New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Eth- 
ics, Op. 528 (1981) (client's whereabouts clearly confidential and need not be disclosed) and 
New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 529 (1981) (lawyer not re- 
quired to withdraw from representation of fugitive who refuses to surrender) overruling New 
York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 405 (1975). Compare also New 
York County Lawyer's Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 462 (1958) (no duty to 
disclose) and New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 81-13 (1981, as 
amended 1982) (attorney has option, but no duty to  disclose), reprinted in N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 
1982, a t  26; Dec. 31, 1981, a t  2, and North Carolina Bar Council on Professional Ethics, Op. 
385 (1962), reprinted in 9 N.C. BAR 14 (1962) (duty to disclose arises when client practices 
fraud or deception). See also Matter of Jacqueline F., 94 Misc. 2d 96, 404 N.Y.S.2d 790 
(Bronx Cty. Surr. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 65 A.D.2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1st Dept. 1978), aff'd, 
47 N.Y.2d 215,391 N.E.2d 967,417 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1979) (depending upon circumstances of 
case, address of client may or may not be privileged; attorney could be compelled on pain of 
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questions "as uncharted as they are funda~nental."~' 
D. Role Conflict in Law. and in Psychiatry 
1. Similarities 
Lawyers, then, are no strangers to the kind of role conflict that 
psychiatrists feel was imposed on them by the Tarasoff ruling. 
Like psychiatrists, lawyers have reacted to efforts to moderate 
their loyalty to clients by conjuring up the image of professional 
colleagues in the Eastern Bloc. Horror stories of Cuban and Bulga- 
rian lawyers who, instead of defending their clients, more or less 
acquiesce in their execution" are reminiscent of the tocsin sounded 
about the role of Soviet psychiatry in suppressing dissidence. In 
each instance, the profession has countered a perceived threat to 
its autonomous self-regulation with the slippery-slope argument 
that "it could happen here." 
It is disconcerting for a lawyer trained in our adversary system 
to read statements such as those of Ma Rongjie, a prominent crim- 
inal defense lawyer from the People's Republic of China. Speaking 
of his defense of Jiang Qing, the widow of Mao Zedong and one of 
the Gang of Four, Mr. Ma explained that there never was any rea- 
son for him to meet his client because "the police and the prosecu- 
tors worked on the case a long time, and the evidence they found 
which wasn't true they threw away."" In China, said Mr. Ma, law- 
yers are "servants of the state" and their role is limited to pleading 
mitigating circumstances for clients whose guilt is largely predeter- 
mined." Yet even under such a system, some vestige of the law- 
yer's professional responsibility to suppress emotions contradictory 
to the needs of the client can be detected. During the Cultural 
contempt to disclose, notwithstanding privilege claim); Richards v. Richards, 64 Misc. 285, 
119 N.Y.S. 81, aff'd, 143 A.D. 906, 127 N.Y.S. 1141 (1st Dept. 1911) (address of client is 
unprivileged). But see Waldmann v. Waldmann, 48 Ohio St. 2d 176,358 N.E.2d 521 (1976) 
(client's address held privileged when it relates to the business and interest of client). 
41 United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 2; Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral 
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060-61 n.1 (1976). 
4S Margolick, Defense Lawyer for the Gang of Four Retains His Faith in C h i ~ a ,  N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 6, 1982, at B5, col. 1. 
44 Id. 
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Revolution, Mr. Ma had spent eight years in prison or at hard la- 
bor. As he put it, "the Gang of Four has caused me a lot of 
trouble." "But," he went on, "I am a lawyer. Even if I hated them 
I had to help them."45 Many American lawyers might say exactly 
the same thing. 
2. And a Difference 
In view of the parallel trends in law and in psychiatry toward 
increasing emphasis on the professional's duty to people other than 
the client or patient, it  is hardly surprising that after Tarasoff a 
movement began to impose a mandatory obligation, as opposed to 
a discretionary power, on attorneys to disclose client confidences 
when the consequences of not doing so might place the life or 
safety of a third party in jeopardy. That movement seems to have 
stalled temporarily, and the previous understanding that lawyers 
should exercise professional judgment in determining when, if ever, 
to resort to disclosure of client confidences seems to have been re- 
instated. As this paper tries to show, the analogy between a psychi- 
atrist caught in a Tarasoff bind and the lawyer in a similar situa- 
tion has superficial appeal but ultimately is unconvincing. Because 
of the unique status of psychiatrists in our society, the psychia- 
trist-patient relationship must be distinguished from all others, 
and its limits differently defined. 
E. The Power of Psychiatrists 
The historical development of psychiatrists' power to influence a 
broad array of legal rights has been exhaustively documented, and 
need not be reiterated here. In his final book, Dr. Robitscher pro- 
vided a comprehensive summary of the dimensions of this po~er . '~  
To mention only a few: psychiatric opinions of mental competence 
are usually conclusive, whether they focus on the general ability to 
manage affairs or on a specific capacity, such as the capacity to 
assist in one's defense at  a criminal trial. Psychiatric findings of 
prior incompetence can void a will, a contract, or a marriage. Psy- 
Id. at B1, col. 4. 
J. ROBITSCHER, Fifty-One Ways Psychiatrists Exercise Authority, in THE POWERS OP 
PSYCHIATRY 401 (1980). 
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chiatrists could enable a man to avoid the draft or a woman to get 
an abortion, when those were crucial issues (as soon they may be 
again). Psychiatric evaluations are often required in the processing 
of an application for a "sensitive" job in private industry as well as 
in the military or government. Psychiatric testimony frequently 
will decide the question of child custody. And since the time of 
Benjamin Rush and Phillipe Pinel, physicians of the mind have 
been able to excuse the criminally accused from moral responsibil- 
ity and legal guilt. 
Psychiatrists make the plausible point that these so-called "pow- 
ers" are illusory, since their expert opinions may be rejected in 
their entirety by the judges and juries who hear them. Dr. Robit- 
scher discounted that point as theoretically valid but of minimal 
significance in actual practice. "The argument of psychiatrists that 
decisions are made by courts, not psychiatrists, does not stand up. 
In fact, courts do not understand psychiatry; they rely on psychia- 
trists to interpret psychiatric issues in legal terms, and in very 
many cases they accept psychiatric testimony ~ncritically."~~ 
The most dramatic illustration of the effect of psychiatric exper- 
tise on legal rights has always been its use to deprive people of 
their liberty, either temporarily and directly through an emergency 
commitment order, or indefinitely and indirectly through testi- 
mony supportive of judicial c~mmi tmen t .~~  It was this power to 
Id. a t  27. See also Settle & Oppegard, The Pre-Trial Examination of Federal Defen- 
dants, 35 F.R.D. 475, 479-80 (1965) (courts tend to rely "almost 100%" on the results of 
psychiatric evaluations in determining competence to stand trial); Vann & Morganroth, The 
Psychiatrist as  Judge: A Second Look a t  Competence to Stand Trial, 43 U. DET. L.J. 1, 9 
(1965) (psychiatric determinations of competency are rarely questioned; "judges tend to fol- 
low recommendations of psychiatrists"). This may be particularly true with respect to civil 
commitment proceedings. See Monahan, Empirical Analysis of Civil Commitment: Critique 
and Context, 11 L. & SOC'Y REV. 619, 622-23 (1977) (reporting on clinical investigations 
that found judges ordering commitments based on psychiatric recommendations despite ex- 
plicit findings of no supporting evidence); Wexler, The Administration of Psychiatric Jus- 
tice, in MENTAL HEALTH LAW: MAJOR ISSUES 71,101 (1981) ('The judge whosigns the com- 
mitment order is the most significant figure in the commitment process by only a small 
margin. The physician's recommendation is probably the most important single factor in the 
commitment decision."). 
Every jurisdiction, either by statute or through common law, permits the immediate 
detention for medical evaluation of persons alleged to be mentally ill and "dangerous" to 
themselves, to others, or to property. Most states provide for long-term confinement of indi- 
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commit that Dr. Robitscher called "a basic underpinning of psy- 
chiatric authority" which "sets psychiatrists apart from others in 
our so~ie ty ."~~ In the last decade, however, death penalty statutes 
that require an assessment of the probability that a given defen- 
viduals certified as "in need of care and treatment." State statutory schemes vary enor- 
mously in terms of the specific conditions for their invocation, the procedural safeguards 
associated with them, and the qualiications of those licensed to initiate such proceedings 
(ranging from "next friend" through "peace officer" to "physician") See Brake1 & Rock, 
Involuntary Hospitalization, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (rev. ed. 1971). 
However, the element of mental illness, albeit under a host of different titles, is an indispen- 
sable predicate of all these schemes, see, e.g., Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some 
Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 32 (1970); Developments in the Law 
-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,87 HARV. L. REV. 1190,1202 (1974), and ultimately 
the participation of a psychiatrist is required to confirm a diagnosis of mental illness. 
The ferment in this area of the law has spawned an immense forensic literature and n 
complex jurisprudence on the criteria and pFocesses by which involuntary civil commitment 
may be authorized. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (commitment of minor at 
parent's request requires inquiry by neutral fact finder; requirement may be satisfied by 
thorough psychiatric investigation and review); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) 
(clear and convincing evidence standard for involuntary civil commitment required by 14th 
Amendment); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (state cannot constitutionally 
confine a nondangerous person capable of surviving safely in freedom); Baxstrom v. Herold, 
383 U.S. 107 (1966) (judicial determination of dangerousness and mental illness required to 
"recommit1' prisoner whose sentence expired); I n  re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C.Cir. 1973) 
(burden of proof of mental illness and dangerousness in involuntary civil commitment pro- 
ceeding must be beyond reasonable doubt); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 
1972) (constitutional right to individual treatment if involuntarily committed), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Lessard v. 
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wi. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 
U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (due process safeguard of a 
preliminary hearing is required prior to an involuntary commitment); Dixon v. Attorney 
Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (formal hearing required to "recommit" mentally 
disabled). See also Elliot, Procedures for Involuntary Commitment on the Basis of Alleged 
Mental Illness, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 231 (1970) (recent trend toward giving greater weight to 
psychiatric judgment concerning involuntary hospitalization); Livermore, Malmquist, & 
Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968) (ease with 
which one is classified as mentally ill should raise doubt as to the validity of sole reliance on 
psychiatric evaluation); Robitscher, Legal Standards and Their Implications Regarding 
Civil Commitment Procedures, in DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL 
HWTH 61 (C. Frederick ed. 1978); Roth, Dayley, & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric 
Reliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 400 (1973) 
(court commitment hearings place a barrier between unfettered psychiatric discretion and 
the patient); Shuman, The Road to Bedlam: Evidentiary Guardposts in Civil Commitment 
Proceedings, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 53 (1979) (state statutes employ traditional due process 
protections in civil commitment). 
Robitscher, The Limits of Psychiatric Authority, 1 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 183,188 
(1978). 
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dant will pose a "continuing threat to society"60 have provided 
psychiatrists with the opportunity to dispense not just liberty but 
life. 
A Texas psychiatrist, James Grigson, has not hesitated to con- 
clude from a 90-minute "mental status examination" that the de- 
fendant he examined was a "sociopath" who could not be treated 
or rehabilitated and who would commit further acts of violence.51 
Dr. Grigson apparently has yet to meet a defendant whom he does 
not think dangerous. His testimony for the prosecution in dozens 
of cases has resulted in a long list of capital sentences, earning the 
psychiatrist the ghastly sobriquet of "Dr. Death."62 Only within 
the past year has the Supreme Court prohibited the practice of 
compelling defendants in custody to submit to such examination 
without notice to their counsel and warnings about the purpose of 
the inter vie^.^^ The Court refused, however, to exclude from sen- 
tencing proceedings psychiatric testimony on the propensity of a 
defendant to commit violence, thereby tacitly endorsing the claim 
that psychiatrists can make such predi~t ions.~~ 
no See, e.g., IDAHO CODE 5 19-2515(f)(8) (1979); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) 
(Vernon 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 10.94.020 (repealed 1981). See also Bonnie, Fore- 
word, Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: Emerging Problems in Virginia, 66 VA. L. REV. 
167, 177-78 (1980) ("Since courts will not ordinarily possess the clinical sophistication to 
determine whether an opinion rests on an accepted theoretical foundation, we must depend 
on clinicians themselves, as a matter of professional ethics, to be sensitive to the limits of 
their own expertise and to qualify their opinions accordingly."); Dix, Participation by 
Mental Health Professionals in Capital Murder Sentencing, 1 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 283
(1978) (the extent to which testimony by mental health professionals is relied upon in the 
imposition of the death penalty varies from state to state); Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dan- 
gerousness," Psychiatric Testimony and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151 (1977) 
(psychiatric testimony is relied upon in determining an individual's dangerouness to 
society). 
O1 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 457-60 (1981). 
" See Tierney, Doctor, Is This Man Dangerous? 3 Scr. 82 at  28 (June 1982). See also J. 
ROBITSCHER, supra note 7, at 199-204. 
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
" Id. at 472-73. But cf. People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733,767,631 P.2d 446,466,175 
Cal. Rptr. 738,759 (1981) (court reversed first degree homicide conviction because of admis- 
sion at  penalty phase of trial of testimony of psychopharmacologist who predicted defen- 
dant would probably "engage in future violence"; court noted "[elxpert predictions that 
persons will commit future acts of violence are unreliable, and frequently erroneous; . . . 
such forecasts, despite their unreliability and doubtful relevance, may be extremely 
prejudicial."). 
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It may well be that these extraordinary powers were more or less 
thrust upon the psychiatric profession by a society anxious to seize 
upon some "scientific" basis for their exercise. Until quite recently, 
however, psychiatrists have not sought in any organized fashion to 
disavow either this authority or its underlying rationale: their sup- 
posed ability to determine from a clinical evaluation that an indi- 
vidual is "dangerous." Even though the American Psychiatric As- 
sociation authorized and filed an amicus brief in Estelle v. Smith 
challenging Grigson's te~timony,6~ only a few mental health profes- 
sionals have deplored Dr. Grigson's role in Texas courts. It was the 
profession's willingness to accept attribution of a peculiar expertise 
in predicting future conduct that landed psychiatrists in the 
Tarasoff quandary. 
III .  THE Tarasoff DECISION 
A. The Facts of Tarasope 
Prosenjit Poddar was a Bengali of the Harijan (untouchable) 
caste who had worked his way up through the Indian educational 
system. He was sent to study naval architecture a t  the Berkeley 
campus of the Unversity of California in the fall of 1967. A year 
later, he met a young woman, Tatiana Tarasoff, whose variable re- 
sponses to his attentions he evidently misinterpreted. After her 
final rejection of him, Poddar became inconsolably dejected and 
began to exhibit symptoms of clinical depression: eating and sleep- 
ing irregularly, failing to keep up with his studies or his job, and 
listening endlessly to tape recordings he had secretly .made of his 
conversations with the girl. In June of 1969, a t  the urging of a 
O6 Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at  11, Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (urging a limited prohibition on testimony as to long-term pre- 
dictions of violence by psychiatrists). 
* The statement of Tarasof's facts in this section derives from numerous sources, 
principally the following: People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750,518 P.2d 342,111 Cal. Rptr. 910 
(1974); Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976); Wilade,  Psychotherapeutic Discretion and Judicial Decision: A 
Case of Enigmatic Justice, hi THE LAW-WICINE RELATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL EWLORATION 
139 (H.T. Engelhardt, J. Healey, & S. Spicker eds. 1981). There are at  least a score of other 
articles about this celebrated case in the academic legal literature alone. See the list in Note, 
Discovery of Psychotherapist-Patient Communications after Tarasoff, 15 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 265, 266 n.8 (1978). 
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friend, Poddar agreed to become a voluntary outpatient a t  the stu- 
dent health service. Diagnosed as an acute paranoid schizophrenic, 
Poddar was placed under the care of a clinical psychologist. 
In late August, after a total of nine therapy sessions, Poddar 
confided to his therapist that he intended to kill Tatiana when she 
returned from summer vacation. (Although he did not identify the 
subject of his threats by name, there was apparently no contention 
that her identity was not easily ascertainable.) In addition, the 
friend who had originally persuaded Poddar to seek professional 
help had reported to the therapist that Poddar planned to buy a 
gun. When the therapist asked his patient to promise fiat to harm 
Tatiana, Poddar left in a huff. The therapist, after consulting with 
two psychiatrists, decided to commit Poddar for observation and 
requested assistance from the campus police.67 Within three days, 
several officers took Poddar into custody and searched his rooms. 
They released him after he managed to convince them that he was 
rational and that he would stay away from Tatiana. 
Poddar never returned to therapy and no subsequent effort was 
made either to commit him or to contact Tatiana or her family. 
Instead, the clinic director specifically ordered that all records of 
the commitment attempt be destroyed, which in fact was not done, 
and that no further action be taken, supposedly because he did not 
The therapist's letter to W i a m  Beall, Chief of Campus Police, dated August 20, 
1969, read as follows: 
Dear Chief Beall: 
Mr. Poddar was first seen at  Cowell Hospital by Dr. Stuart Gold, June 5,1969, on an emer- 
gency basis. After receiving medication he was referred to the outpatient psychiatry clinic 
for psychotherapy. Since then I have seen him here seven times. 
His mental status varies considerably. At times he appears to be quite rational, a t  other 
times he appears quite psychotic. It is my impression that currently the appropriate diagno- 
sis for him is paranoid schizophrenic reaction, acute and severe. He is at  this point a danger 
to the welfare of other people and himself. That is, he had been threatening to kill an un- 
named girl who he feels has betrayed and violated his honor. He has told a friend of hi 
(Farrokhq Mistree, also of International House) that he intends to go to San Francisco to 
buy a gun and that he plans to kill the girl. He has been somewhat more cryptic with me, 
but he has alluded strongly to the compulsion to "get even with," and "hurt" the girl. 
I have discussed this matter with Dr. Gold and we concur in the opinion that Mr. Poddar 
should be committed for observation in a mental hospital. I request the assistance of your 
department in this matter. [Signed] Lawrence Moore, Ph.D. Clinical Psychologist. Depart- 
ment of Psychiatry (on file with the author). 
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want the judgment of the campus police called into question. 
Meanwhile, Poddar had developed a friendship with Tatiana's 
brother Alex and had become his roommate. ~ l e x  knew that Pod- 
dar had threatened his sister, but, for whatever reasons, did not 
take the threat seriously. 
After Tatiana's return to campus that fall, Poddar plagued the 
girl, constantly trying to see and speak with her. She rebuffed him 
unequivocally. Poddar's obsession peaked in late October. He 
fought with Alex, who warned him that if Poddar did not leave 
Tatiana alone, he would suffer a t  the hands of her father. That did 
not keep Poddar from repeatedly going to the Tarasoff home and 
demanding to see Tatiana. Finally, on the evening of October 27, 
1969, Poddar found Tatiana home alone. She allowed him to come 
in, but soon asked him to leave. He shot her with a pellet gun and 
stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. He then called the po- 
lice and surrendered. 
During a seventeen day trial, Poddar's attorney raised both an 
insanity and a diminished capacity defense. The jury found him 
sane and his capacity for specific intent unimpaired, and convicted 
him of second-degree murder. On appeal, the conviction was re- 
versed due to a flaw in the jury instructions. Since it appeared un- 
likely that a retrial held more than five years after the first would 
result in a conviction, the State agreed to release Poddar on condi- 
tion that he immediately return to India, where he is now married 
to a lawyer-it is said, happily so. 
Tatiana's parents sued the psychologist, the psychiatrists, the 
campus police, and the University of California for $200,000 in 
damages, citing two causes of action: the failure to warn them or 
Tatiana of the impending danger, and the negligent failure to 
bring about Poddar's commitment. It seemed evident that statu- 
tory governmental immunity shielded al l  the defendants from lia- 
bility for erroneous decisions in the commitment process, so that 
the only remaining foundation for the suit was what the plaintiffs 
dubbed a "duty to warn." 
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B. Rationale and Analysis 
1. The Duty To Warn 
In the absence of a specific statutory provision to the contrary, 
there generally is no aflirmative duty to control the behavior of 
another, nor to warn a third person of another's threat.6s In other 
words, as one commentator on Tarasoff notesP9 had Poddar con- 
fided his homicidal intention to a neighbor or the local barkeep, 
that individual would bear no legal responsibility for failing to dis- 
close the danger or prevent the tragedy, despite the absence of any 
legal or ethical obligation to preserve confidentiality. Before 
Tarasoff the only exceptions to this general proposition were two 
situations: when a special relationship, usually custodial but always 
controlling, existed between the party considered responsible and a 
person whose dangerousness had, or should have, been recognized; 
and when there had been an express undertaking by the party con- 
sidered responsible to protect or warn a foreseeable victim.BO 
For example, cases in many jurisdictions have imposed liability 
on psychiatric hospitals for injuries resulting from negligent super- 
vision or release of a dangerous inpatient and, in one instance, 
even for injury due to negligent failure to admit a patient who 
presented himself for care.61 Damages have also been assessed 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 315 (1965); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK F THE 
LAW OF TORTS 8 356 (4th ed. 1971); Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of 
Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934). 
Be See Note, Torts-Duty to Act for Protection of Another-Liability of Psychothera- 
pist for Failure to Warn of Homicide Threatened by Patient, 28 VAND. L. REV. 631, 639 
(1975). 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,435, 551 P.2d 334,343, 131 
Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 315-20 (1965). 
See Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. P a  1971). See also Semler v. Psy- 
chiatric Inst, 538 F.2d 121 (4th Ci.) (negligent release of dangerous patient in violation of 
court order), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975) (negligent failure to diiclose records to court resulting in release of dangerous 
patient); Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966) (negligent failure to 
transfer records to new psychiatrist resulting in release of dangerous patient); Smith v. 
United States, 437 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (negligent transfer of suicidal patient to 
open facility), reu'd on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1978); Merchants Nat'l Bank 
& Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967) (negligent failure of veterans 
administration hospital to warn employer of furloughed patient of his "dangerousness" ena- 
bled patient to escape supervision and kill his wife); Department of Health & Rehabilitative 
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against guardians for failure to warn a temporary caretaker of the 
violent disposition of a minor Agencies of the state have 
been held responsible for failing to warn foreseeable victims that a 
prisoner was about to be paroled, but only when there had been a 
prior promise to do Finally, returning to a medical context, 
physicians have been required to compensate those infected as a 
result of their failure to diagnose and to warn others about a pa- 
tient's contagious c o n d i t i ~ n . ~ ~  In most of these cases, however, the 
Sews. v. McDougall, 359 So. 2d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (negligent supervision by 
hospital personnel resulted in escape of dangerous inmate). But cf. Centeno v. New York, 48 
A.D.2d 812, 369 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1st Dep't 1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 932 (1976): 
Although another physician might disagree as to the form and period of treatment 
to be followed, a liability would not arise; nor would i t  arise if the professional 
judgment to discharge him was in fact erroneous. The prediction of the future 
course of a mental illness is a professional judgment of high responsibility and in 
some instances it involves a measure of calculated risk. If a liability were imposed 
on the physician or the State each time the prediction of future course of mental 
disease was wrong, few releases would ever be made and the hope of recovery and 
rehabilitation of a vast number of patients would be impeded and frustrated. This 
is one of the medical and public risks which must be taken on balance, even 
though it may sometimes result in injury to the patient or others. 
Id. at  813, 369 N.Y.S.2d a t  711 (1st Dep't 1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 932 (1976). 
See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968) 
(parole authority held responsible for not warning foster parents that ward placed in their 
care was dangerous); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) (parenb 
held responsible for failiig to warn babysitter that child was "dangerous"). See generally 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 316 (1965). 
6S See, e.g., Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938,41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1964) 
(county liable for s h e m s  failure to warn decedent of release of dangerous prisoner after 
promisiig to do so). But cf. Wiiarns v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E.2d 545 (1955) (as a 
matter of public policy, state would not be liable for death caused by escaped convict, even 
if negligently permitted to escape; state's duty with respect to psychiatric patients greater 
than with respect to prisoners). The decision in Thompson v. County of Alameda, 88 Cal. 
App. 3d 936, 152 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1979), a post-Tarasoff case indicating that liability could 
attach to a state agency responsible for releasing a dangerous ward without warning those 
foreseeably endangered, even in the absence of a prior promise to do so, was reversed by the 
California Supreme Court. 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980) (en banc). 
See, e.g., Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385,227 S.W. 612 (1921) (physician can be held 
liable for negligent failure to advise nurses and parents of risk from child with typhoid 
fever); Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (holding physician 
owes duty to minor chid living with parent suffering contagious disease to inform those 
charged with minor's care of disease and steps necessary to prevent child's exposure), cert. 
denied, 245 So. 2d 257 (Fla 1971); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919) 
(physician's duty to notify public officials and parents of danger from child with scarlet 
fever); Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 
1959) (failure to advise wife of husband's tuberculosis held actionable); Jones v. Stanko, 118 
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physician had not complied with an explicit statutory mandate to 
report every case of a particular infectious disease.66 
These decisions reflect the policy judgment that, in some situa- 
tions, the person most likely to foresee an injury should bear the 
risk of its occurrence and the burden of taking steps to prevent it. 
Before Tarasoff, however, no court had ever extended this princi- 
ple to a psychotherapist's relationship with a voluntary outpatient. 
In addition, the California statute under which Poddar's emer- 
gency detention could have been authorized seems clearly to pro- 
hibit disclosure of confidential information, except to the patient's 
relatives or to law enforcement agencies.B6 In asking the campus 
police for assistance, the Berkeley therapists had adhered to the 
exact course of action prescribed by the statute. 
The trial judge felt constrained to dismiss the case since there 
was no direct precedent for the claim. The plaintiffs appealed the 
dismissal of their case to California's Supreme Court. In Tarasoff 
u. Regents of the University of Ca l i f~ rn i a ,~~  that court reversed 
the dismissal and reinstated the claims against both the police and 
the therapists. This meant that the plaintiffs would be permitted 
to try to prove their allegations at  a trial, and if successful, could 
collect damages attributable to the failure of the police and the 
therapists to warn them of Poddar's threat. .The court focused its 
attention on the abortive effort to commit Poddar, characterizing 
it as a "Good Samaritan" act-a step that need not be attempted 
but that once undertaken must be carried out in a non-negligent 
fashion.68 
Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928) (failure to notify public officials and "persons in proxim- 
ity" to smallpox victim of contagious nature of disease can constitute negligence). See gen- 
erally Annot., 5 A.L.R. 926 (1920); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons s 480') (1951 & Supp. 
1981); 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers 245-46 (1981). 
See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 5s 2101,2225-2226,2300 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 
1981). 
" CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE 5328.3 (West 1972). 
13 Cal. 3d 177,529 P.2d 553,118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tarasoff 
I]. 
" On the duty of a "Good Samaritan" to proceed non-negligently, see generally 
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 276 nn.113-15 (1980). Most 
states, however, protect physicians and other medical personnel from liability for conse- 
quences of even negligent acts committed while gratuitously aiding people in emergencies. 
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2. A Special Relationship 
The psychiatric profession's outraged reaction to Tarasoff IB8 led 
the California Supreme Court to take the unusual step of granting 
a petition for rehearing. This time, the defendants were assisted by 
the filing of several amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the American 
Psychiatric Association and other professional organi~ations.~~ 
Eighteen months after the original ruling, a final decision was 
rendered. 
Again, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal 
and reinstituted the suit, holding: 
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of 
his profession should determine, that his patient presents a 
serious threat of violence to another, he incurs an obligation 
to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against 
such danger. The discharge of this duty may require the ther- 
apist to take one or more of various steps, depending upon 
the nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn the 
intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the 
danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps 
are reasonably necessary under the circumstances." 
At the same time the court cautioned: 
We realize that the open and confidential character of psy- 
chotherapeutic dialogue encourages patients to express 
See generally G. &NAS, L. GLANTZ, & B. KATZ, THE RIGHTS OF DOCTORS, NURSES AND AL- 
LIED HEALTH PROPESSIONALS 106-07 (1981); Zaremski, Good Samaritan Statutes: Do They 
Protect the Emergency Care Provider? 7 MEDICOLEGAL NEWS 5 (1979). 
For example: "To make a law of this understanding puts psychiatrists in a position 
where they have to respond even to idle threats." Therapists and Threats, TIME, Jan. 20, 
1975, a t  56 (statement of Dr. Alfred Freedman, past prenident of the American Psychiatric 
Association); "The soundest practice is to try to defuse n person's homicidal urges through 
treatment. The minute you report them, they drop out of therapy. . . . If you locked up 
everybody who made a threat there wouldn't be enough room in the hospitals." California 
Court Limits Doctor-Patient Privilege, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25,1974, a t  15, col. 1 (statement of 
Dr. Morris Grossman, Stanford University Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry). 
lo Other organizations included the California State Psychiatric Association, the San 
Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute, the National Association of Social Workers, and the Cal- 
ifornia Hospital Association. 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,431,551 P.2d 334, 340, 131 
Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (1976). 
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threats of violence, few of which are ever executed. Certainly 
a therapist should not be encouraged routinely to reveal such 
threats; such disclosures could seriously disrupt the patient's 
relationship with his therapist and with the persons 
threatened. To the contrary, the therapist's obligations to his 
patient require that he not disclose a confidence unless such 
disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others and even 
then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that would pre- 
serve the privacy of his patient to the fullest extent compati- 
ble with the prevention of the threatened dangersT2 
The hardship for therapists of trying to negotiate a safe passage 
between the Scylla of unjustified disclosure and the Charybdis of 
failure to warn was somewhat mitigated by the court's ruling that 
their judgment need not be "perfect," but merely must evince 
"that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily 
possessed and exercised by members of [their profession] under 
similar   circumstance^."^^ While the court did not limit the thera- 
pist's obligation to act to cases in which the identity of the victim 
was known, it did recognize that a therapist could not be required 
to "interrogate" the patient, or to "conduct an independent inves- 
tigation" in order to discover the victim's identity.?' The case 
never actually went to trial, but was settled on terms "within the 
range for wrongful death of a college girlwT6 on July 1, 1977--one 
year to the day after the second Tarasoff opinion. 
7P Id. at  441, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27. 
Id. at  438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. a t  25 (citations omitted). 
74 Id. at  439 n.11, 551 P.2d at 335 n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.11. The California Su- 
preme Court has since made it absolutely clear that a nonspecific threat directed at  the 
general population cannot be the predicate for Tarasoff liability, even when it  might be 
reasonable to expect the therapist to recognize that a patient poses danger to the commu- 
nity a t  large. The potential victim of the patient has to be "readily identifiable" in order to 
trigger a Tarasoff duty. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741,754,614 P.2d 
728,735,167 Cal. Rptr. 70,76 (1980). See also Hooks v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical 
Group, 107 Cal. App. 3d 435,165 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1980) (duty to warn when foreseeable risk 
of harm to foreseeable victim exists); Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 
162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1980), discussed in text accompanying notes 152-56 infra. The reasoning 
in Hooks has also been adopted by a federal district court. See Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. 
Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981), discussed in text accompanying notes 178-81 infra. 
76 Personal communication from George Alexander McKray, Esq., counsel for the 
Tarasoffs, on June 28, 1979. 
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The major difference between the initial opinion and the deci- 
sion after rehearing is the responsibility placed on the police. In 
the second opinion, neither a "duty to warn" nor a duty to take 
special steps to protect the victim was imposed on the police, de- 
spite their express duty to assure public safety and their freedom 
from any obligation to preserve the confidentiality of Poddar's 
statements. If a therapist's responsibility in these circumstances 
can be met by communicating the perceived danger to law enforce- 
ment authorities, as Tarasoff clearly says, why should such author- 
ities-whose power to restrain the liberty of the "dangerous" per- 
son exceeds that of any therapist- themselves be exonerated from 
liability for failing to warn the victim or prevent the harm?-The 
California Supreme Court's only stated reason for upholding the 
dismissal of the suit against the police was the absence of a "spe- 
cial relationship," such as that of psychotherapist and patient, be- 
tween the police and Poddar. The Tarasoff ruling centers on this 
concept of a "special relationship," and on the posited ability of 
therapi~ts'~ to anticipate potential violence in patients. Analogiz- 
ing the relationship to other "controlling" relationships, the court 
suggested that therapists can control their dangerous patients 
through the exercise of both their statutory authority to initiate 
commitment proceedings and their therapeutic influence. 
IV. Tarasoff's CONSEQUENCES FOR PSYCHIATRIC P ACTICE 
A. The Limits of Psychiatric Expertise 
1. Diagnosing Dangerousness and Predicting Behavior 
It has been asserted, reasonably enough, that the Tarasoff court 
hoist psychiatrists with their own petard. Having failed to correct 
" In its discussion of the duty to disclose, the Tarasoff court did not distinguish psy- 
chiatrists from other professionals engaged in treating the mentally ill or emotionally dis- 
turbed, and used the comprehensive term "psychotherapist*'. Nothing in the Tararsoff opin- 
ion or in subsequent decisions limits the applicability of the duty to Board-certified 
psychiatrists or even to physicians. See People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 768-69 n.31, 
631 P.2d 446,467 n.31, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738,759 n.31 (1981) (judicial notice taken of studies 
showing unreliability of psychiatrists' attempts to forecast violence; such studies held likely 
to apply to psychologists' forecasts as well). For a discussion of the applicability of Tarasoff 
to psychiatric nurses, see Kjervik, The Psychiatric Nurse's Duty to Warn Potential Victims 
of Homicidal Psychotherapy Outpatients, 9 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 11 (1981). 
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the perception of judges, correctional authorities, legislators, and 
the public that they are capable of detecting "dangerousness," and 
having acquired in large part the power to determine society's re- 
action to the "dangerous" individ~al,?~ psychiatrists now arguably 
are confronted with the logical implications of that power. 
Individual members of the profession, as well as commentators 
from other fields, have long concurred that, in the legal arena, psy- 
chiatrists are induced to exceed the bounds of their genuine com- 
petence and too often allow themselves to render extraordinarily 
complex and difficult value judgments in the guise of "scientific" 
opinion.78 Jonas Robitscher, for one, devoted a significant portion 
of his career to exposing and combatting such malpractice.7s But 
on the whole, prior to Tarasoff, this concern had not been em- 
braced, nor had evidence of its potential for abuse been mar- 
shalled, by broad-based and representative groups within the pro- 
fession. It is somewhat ironic that only six months before the 
decision in Tarasoff I a prestigious task force of the American Psy- 
chiatric Association concluded that "neither psychiatrists nor any- 
one else have reliably demonstrated an ability to predict future vi- 
olence or 'dangerousness.' Neither has any special psychiatric 
expertise in this area been e~tablished."~~ 
On the rehearing of Tarasoff I, the attorneys for the American 
Psychiatric Association and other professional organizations as 
amici curiae cited that report and contended that the imposition 
of a duty to take reasonable measures to protect the potential vic- 
tim of a dangerous patient was unfair, because psychiatrists simply 
77 "If a sociologist predicted that a person was 80 percent likely to commit a felonious 
act, no law would permit his confinement. On the other hand, if a psychiatrist testified that 
a person was mentdy ill and 80 percent Iikely to commit a dangerous act, the patient would 
be committed!' Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111: Theories and Procedures, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1290 (1966). 
See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 15; Dershowitz, supra note 48; Hdeck, A Critique of 
Current Psychiatric Roles in the Legal Process, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 379; Suarez, A Critique 
of the Psychiatrist's Role as Expert Witness, 12 J. FORENSIC CI. 172 (1967). See generally 
B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1972); T. Swsz, IDEOLOGY AND INSANXTY (1972); T. 
SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963). 
7D See, e.g., Robitscher, supra note 49. 
O0 A.P.A. TASK FORCE ON CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL, REPORT 8: 
CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 28 (1974). 
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cannot accurately foresee violent behavior in their patients, and 
was unwise, because of the disastrous impact of such a duty on the 
practice of psychotherapy. They brought to the court's attention 
numerous articles and studies purporting to demonstrate that, in 
the current state of the art, psychiatrists consistently overpredict 
violent behavior-that their predictions may well be no more relia- 
ble than those arrived at  by the toss of a coin.81 
A'storm of criticism from psychiatrists followed in the wake of 
the second Tarasoff opinion, echoing the contentions advanced by 
the arnicis2 Conceding the low reliability and questionable validity 
of psychiatric diagnoses-what detractors have called psychiatric 
"labelsyy-some psychiatrists maintain that susceptibility to error 
is even more pronounced in their prognoses, and most problematic 
of all when their task is the prediction of violent behavior.s3 A vio- 
See, e.g., A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 33 (1975). 
Stone states: 
It can easily be stated flatly on the basis of my own review of the published mate- 
rial on the prediction of dangerous acts that neither objective actuarial tables nor 
psychiatric intuition, diagnosis, and psychological testing can claim predictive suc: 
cess. . . . The mental health professionals . . . simply have no demonstrated ca- 
pacity to generate even a cutting line that will confine more true than false 
positives. 
See ako J. MONAHAN, The Prevention of Violence, in CO~~MUNITY MENTAL HEALTH AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1976); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 
123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1974); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Exper- 
tise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974); Steadman & Keveles, 
The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Baxstrom Patients: 1966-70,129 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 304 (1972). 
See, e.g., Gurevitz, Tarasoff: Protective Privilege Versus Public Peril, 134 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 289, 291 (1977); McDonald, The "Warning" Decision-Further Complications, 
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Jan. 21, 1977, a t  33; Shah, Dangerousness-A Paradigm for Exploring 
Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 224 (1978); Skodol & Karasu, 
Emergency Psychiatry and the Assaultive Patient, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 202 (1978). The 
Tarasoff decision poses an impossible dilemma for clinicians, according to the Recom- 
mended Position Statement on the Tarasoff Decision of the American Psychiatric Associn- 
tion Committee on Confidentiality, quoted in Beigler, Privacy and Confidentiality, in LAW 
AND ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY a t  69, 82-83 (C.K. Hofling ed. 1981). 
83 "Psychiatrists can predict dangerousness about as well as h e  corner butcher." State- 
ment of Dr. Stanley Portnow, Associate Professor, N.Y.U. Medical School, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
16,1979, a t  E7; "Psychiatrists don't have the capacity to predict dangerousness. Every em- 
pirical study demonstrates that they cannot. Just because the legal system says you can, 
doesn't make i t  so." Statement of Dr. Alan Stone, President of the American Psychiatric 
Association (1979-80) and Professor, Harvard Law School, in Saxbe, Must Psychotherapists 
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lent assault on another person is a peculiarly difficult phenomenon 
to predict accurately, because it is such a comparatively rare event. 
The prediction of violence, like that of many other low base-rate 
- 
behaviors, is subject to a substantial risk of resulting in "false posi- 
tives"-that is, of identifying as "dangerous" many persons who 
will never engage in violent conduct.84 
Psychiatrists quite properly denounce the term "dangerousness" 
as a legal construct, not a medical one, and an ill-defined, ambigu- 
ous construct a t  that.86 Unlike the "infectiousness" of a disease, 
"dangerousness" is not an objectively verifiable condition. Nor can 
it accurately be considered a personal attribute, or a character 
trait. Rather, like other behavioral-science concepts, it is a way of 
describing the probable outcome of interaction between a person 
and the environment or social situation in which that person func- 
tions. To predict violent behavior is to speculate about someone's 
- 
future response to a complex of variables, any one of which may or 
Warn About Released Patients? N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1980, a t  C3, co1.2. 
The recent highly publicized trial of John W. Hinckley, accused of attempting to assassi- 
nate President Reagan, has once again heightened the controversy over the role of mental 
health professionals in the legal system. While most of the media attention has focused on 
the unexpected verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, and subsequent 
calls for reform or abolition of the insanity defense, the validity of psychiatric predictions of 
long-term "dangerousness" also has come to the fore in connection with the need to assess 
Hinckley's present mental state and eligibiity for release from custody. The general atti- 
tude of mental health professionals se%rns to have undergone radical change since the pre- 
Tarasoff era. In one news report, the emphatic declaration of leading forensic psychiatrist 
Dr. Loren Roth, "Can clinicians say which person will be dangerous in nine months, one 
year or five years? No!" is cited as expressing an opinion generally heid in the psychiatric 
profession. See Pines, Violence Termed Hard to Foretell: Mental Experts Say Profession is 
Not Equipped to Predict How Hinckley May Act, N.Y. Times, June 27,1982, a t  25, col. 1. 
" J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 33 (1981) (citing Meehl 
& Rosen, Antecedent Probability and the Efficacy of Psychometric Signs, Patterns or Cut- 
ting Scores, 52 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 194 (1955), and quoting Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl, 
supra note 48, a t  84). 
See Brooks, Notes on Defining the "Dangerousness" of the Mentally Ill, in DANGER- 
OUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH at  37 (C. Frederick ed. 1978); Shah, 
Dangerousness, supra note 20, a t  156. For a critique and review of the use of the term in the 
context of civil commitment, see Weissbourd, Inuoluntary Commitment: The Moue Toward 
Dangerousness, 15 J. MAR. L. REV. 83 (1982) (court. have tried to resolve confiict of legal 
and psychiatric concerns by emphasis on largely legal concept of dangerousness). See also 
Dershowitz, supra note 48, a t  24. 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  3 1  Emory L. J. 299 1982 
300 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31 
may not occur.se Although actuarial correlates with violent behav- 
ior have been observed:' there appears to be little agreement 
among practitioners, either in terms of theoretical analysis or em- 
pirical research, as to what, other than prior acts of violence, con- 
stitutes a clinical indicator of "dangerousness." Even an expressed 
violent intention, such as that of Prosenjit Poddar, may reflect 
only the harmless discharge of repressed emotion, common in the 
therapeutic process. There are no courses in medical schools and 
psychoanalytic institutes and no definitive texts which explain the 
technique and criteria by which an assessment of "dangerousness" 
can be made.88 Therefore, psychiatrists argue, there is no "stan- 
dard of the profession" for determining when a patient "presents a 
serious danger of violence to another,"8e and the failure to forestall 
or forewarn of such a contingency can never fairly be evaluated by 
the hindsight of judge and jury. 
The profession's shocked and defensive reaction to this new re- 
sponsibility was particularly understandable since the very same 
California court, during the interim between the two Tarasoff deci- 
sions, had decided that the standard of proof required in sex-of- 
fender commitment proceedings based on psychiatric recommen- 
dation must be "beyond a reasonable doubt," noting: 
88 See generally Bem and Funder, Predicting More of the People More of the Time: 
Assessing the Personality of Situations, 85 PSYCHOLOGY REV. 485 (1978); Bowers, Situation- 
ism i n  Psychology: A n  Analysis and Critique, 80 'PSYCHOLOGY REV. 307 (1973); Cohen, 
Groth, & Siegel, The  Clinical Prediction of Dangerousness, 1978 CRIME & DELINQ. 28, 33 
(1978); Lewin, Lippett, & White, Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Cre- 
ated "Social Climates," 10 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 271 (1939). On the importance o f  viewing 
"dangerousness" as a "probabilistic" assessment, the consequences o f  which are dictated by  
social policy and political judgment rather than "objective" science, see Monahan & Wexler, 
A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37 
(1978); Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: A n  Analysis of the Mental Health 
Law, 51 So. CALIF. L. REV. 527, 593-94 (1978). 
" See J. MONAHAN, supra note 84, at 71. For an extraordinarily lucid explanation o f  the 
distinction between cliiical and actuarial or statistical predictive methods and their relative 
benefits and disadvantages, see Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior 
with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979). 
as See Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: 
Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976). 
Tarasoff v. Regents o f  the Univ. o f  Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,431, 551 P.2d 334, 340, 131 
Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (1976). 
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Perhaps the psychiatrist is an expert at  deciding whether a 
person is mentally ill, but is he an expert at  predicting which 
of the persons so diagnosed are dangerous? Sane people too 
are dangerous, and it may legitimately be inquired whether 
there is anything in the education, training, or experience of 
psychiatrists which renders them particularly adept at  pre- 
dicting dangerous behavior. Predictions of dangerous behav- 
ior, no matter who makes them, are incredibly inaccurate, and 
there is a growing consensus that psychiatrists are not 
uniquely qualified to predict dangerous behavior and are, in 
fact, less accurate in their predictions than other 
 professional^.^^ 
Such an assessment of the validity of psychiatric opinion must in- 
deed come as a revelation to the tens of thousands who are invol- 
untarily hospitalized each year because a psychiatrist has found 
them "dangerous," and to the defendants in Texas and Virginia 
who have received death sentences predicated on psychiatric testi- 
mony of "continuing dangerou~ness."~~ Dr. Lee Coleman, a Califor- 
nia psychiatrist whose studies were cited in the A.P.A. amicus 
brief, was moved to comment, after the rehearing of Tarasof I had 
been granted: 
It is hard for me to understand how the psychiatric commu- 
nity can ask to have it both ways-to be free of an obligation 
to warn, on the basis of inability to predict dangerousness, 
and yet to have the authority to incarcerate patients on the 
basis of an ability to predict dangerousnes~.~~ 
2. The "Draconian Dilemma" 
Not only have psychiatrists found Tarasof an opportune reason 
to publicize the limits of their expertise, they have also been im- 
pelled by the decision to acknowledge the role conflict precipitated 
People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 326, 535 P.2d 352, 365, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 501 
(1975) (quoting Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 364-65 n.2 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
See Shah, supra note 82, at 225-26; Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally 
Ill Criminals, 27 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 397 (1972). See also notes 47-55 supra. 
Ayres & Halbrook, Law, Psychotherapy and the Duty to Warn: A Tragic Trilogy? 27 
BAYLOR L. REV. 677, 686 (1975). 
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by their willingness to serve as agents of social control. As the 
Tarasoff dissent observed, therapists are confronted with a "Dra- 
conian dilemma."s9 The obligation of confidentiality in a therapeu- 
tic relationship is not merely a premise of professional ethicsv4 but 
a legally enforceable imperative. Although the duty is qualified,D6 
its violation may be compensated by damages for breach of pri- 
vacy, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied contract, defama- 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,457, 551 P.2d 334, 358, 131 
Cal. Rptr. 14, 38 (1976). 
See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 5 9 (1957), 
reprinted in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS a t  1751 (W.T. Reich ed. 1978); PRINCIPLES OF
MEDICAL ETHICS iv (rev. 1980), reprinted in CURRENT OP~NIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF 
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION a t  ix (1982); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PRIN- 
CIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 9, 
reprinted in 131 An!. J. PSYCHIATRY 1057,1063 (1073); THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH, reprinted in 
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 647 (23d ed. 1976). The legal right and obligation to with- 
hold disclosure of patient confidences in a judicial setting, manifest in testimonial privilege 
statutes which vary from state to state, does not necessarily apply to every type of therapist. 
But the professional ethical obligation of physicians to maintain confidentiality is shared by 
nurses, psychologists, social workers, and other counselors. See, e.g., AMERICAN NURSES' AS- 
SOCIATION, CODE FOR NURSES WITH INTERPRETIVE STATEWNTS § 2 (rev. ed. 1976), reprinted 
in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS a t  1789 (W.T. Reich ed. 1978); AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS, Principle 5 (rev. ed. 1981), reprinted in 
36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 633,635 (1981); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, REVISED 
CODE OF ETHICS 5 2(H), reprinted in 24 N.A.S.W. NEWS 13 (1979). In addition, state regula- 
tions often broadly define the professions in which confidentiality is required. See, e.g., 
STATE OF NEW YORK, OFFICIAL COMPILATION OF CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS, tit. 8, part 
29, § 29.I(b)(8)(1977) (defining "unprofessional conduct in the practice of any profession 
licensed or certified" to include the "revealing of personally identifiable facts, data or infor- 
mation obtained in a professional capacity without the prior consent of the patient or client, 
except as authorized or required by law"). 
88 Simonson v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) (statute that defines be- 
trayal of confidential patient information as unprofessional conduct provides basis for liabil- 
ity for breach, but duty of confidentiality subject to qualification that physician may reveal 
information reasonably necessary to prevent outbreak of contagious disease); Hague v. Wil- 
liams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962) (physician has duty not to disclose patient informa- 
tion except to third party with legitimate interest in patient's health; for example, prospec- 
tive insurer of patient's life); Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 
1960) (patient held to have waived right to confidentiality when psychiatrist revealed pa- 
tient's alcoholism to employer as underlying cause of repeated absences; patient had re- 
quested "medical certificates" excusing absences); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191,331 P.2d 
814 (1958) (psychiatrist may be permitted to reveal patient information for protection of 
third party, but must show due diligence in ascertaining truth, relevance, and necessity of 
revealing information); Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 162 P. 572 (1917) (physician held 
immune from liability for disclosure of patient confidences when disclosures made during 
judicial proceedings). 
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tion, and malpract i~e.~~ Offenders may also, a t  least in principle, be 
gB See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, motion for re- 
consideration denied, 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (court applied Ohio law and held 
that cause of action against insurance company may be based on allegation that company 
wrongfully induced plaintiffs doctor to disclose confidential patient information); Horne v. 
Patton, 291 Ala. 701,287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (in absence of statutory doctor-patient privilege, 
public policy imposes on physicians a qualified duty of confidentiality the breach of which 
gives rise to a cause of action for damages); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S. 801; 805 (4th 
Dep't 1982) (psychiatrist disclosed information to patient's wife; held, patient could sue in 
tort, for breach of fiduciary duty of confidentiality, and thus recover greater damages than if 
sued on implied contract; but affirmative defense of justification recognized "whenever there 
is a danger to the patient, the spouse or another person"); Doe v. Roe, 42 A.D.2d 559, 345 
N.Y.S.2d 560 (1st Dep't 1973) (action will lie against psychiatrist for publication of book 
detailing patient's lengthy psychoanalysis, even if patient's identity somewhat disguised), 
aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 902, 307 N.E.2d 823, 352 N.YS.2d 626 (1973), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 907 
(1974), cert dismissed as improvidently granted, 420 U.S. 307 (1975), permanent injunction 
and damages awarded, 93 Mic.  2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1977); Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 
N.W.2d 134 (S.D. 1974) (practitioner of healing arts may be liable in damages to patients 
for unauthorized disclosure). See generally Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 1109 (1968 & Supp. 1981). 
But see Panko v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1970) (pretrial disclosures 
to adversary actionable only if wrongful and resulted in loss of plaintiff-patient's lawsuit); 
Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Ga. 1957) (court applied Georgia law and held 
that absent statutory privilege, no cause of action for disclosure exists); Hammer v. Polsky, 
36 Misc. 2d 482, 233 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1962) (psychiatrist-defendant 
testified as to plaintiffs mental health on basis of observations made while treating plain- 
tiffs wife; plaintiffs failure to assert existence of doctor-patient relationship held to defeat 
an action for malpractice, assuming without deciding that by statute such testimony was a 
breach of professional obligation of confidentiality); Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 
389 S.W.2d 249 (1965) (no cause of action may lie against company physician for disclosure 
of patient's records to company attorney because codes of ethics are not enforceable a t  law 
and no statutory privilege exists). 
The argument has also been made tha t  the patient's interest in confidentiality within a 
therapeutic relationship is not the creature of changeable statute, but is grounded in a con- 
stitutionally protected right of privacy. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (right to privacy in doctor-patient relationship precludes re- 
quiring parental or spousal consent to patient's abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(constitutional right of privacy in the doctor-patient relationship recognized); Doe v. Bolton, 
410 U.S. 179 (1973) (statute requiring approval of abortion by hospital staff abortion com- 
mittee and by two licensed physicians other than the patient's physician; held, an unconsti- 
tutional infringement of right to private doctor-patient relationship); Jones v. Superior 
Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1981) (constitutional right to privacy in 
doctor-patient relationship not absolute but broader than statutory privilege establishing 
doctor-patient confidentiality); I n  re "B," 394 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1978) (patient's interest in 
preventing disclosure by psychotherapist is constitutionally based, therefore therapist's con- 
viction for refusal to comply with court order to reveal patient's records reversed); Cf. Cae- 
sar v. Montanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976) (right to privacy in psychotherapist-patient 
relationship is not absolute, narrowly drawn patient-litigant exception to privilege rule is 
justified by compelling state interest in ascertainment of truth in court proceedings), cert. 
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disciplined by professional organizations. 
The psychiatrist faced with deciding whether to reveal a pa- 
tient's threat to a potential target is in an unenviable position. Fre- 
quently, such threats are directed toward family members or sig- 
nificant others,B7 and transmitting such a message could destroy or 
seriously disrupt a vital relationship. Merely revealing the fact of 
the patient's status qua psychiatric patient may in and of itself 
irreparably injure reputation, career, and other opportunities and 
interests. Should later judicial review determine that the thera- 
pist's apprehension was unreasonable or unjustified (according to 
the fairly nebulous "standard of the profession," of course) the 
therapist will suffer the civil and professional consequences. If the 
threat is not disclosed and does materialize, liability under a 
Tarasoff theory may attach. Had the California court consciously 
been trying to design a double bind, it could hardly have been 
more successful. 
3. The Exercise of Professional Judgment 
What seems most disturbing to the psychiatrists who oppose the 
Tarasoff doctrine, however, is not just their potential liability for 
wrong choices, but the infringement on their professional discre- 
tion to make such choices. In contrast, consider the statutes in a 
majority of the states which foster the preservation of confidential- 
ity by creating a physician-patient privilege, limiting even judicial 
power to compel disclosure of treatment-related communications 
in the absence of the patient's consent.98 Although the privilege is 
denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415,467 P.2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr. 829 
(1970) (patient-litigant exception did not violate constitutional right to confidentiality in 
psychotherapy). 
See A.P.A. T A ~ K  FORCE ON CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL, supra note 
80, a t  7-9. 
See, e.g., N.Y. CN. PRAC. LAW § 4504(a) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1979) ("Unless the 
patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to practice medicine . . . shall not be al- 
lowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient in a professional 
capacity and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity."). The California 
privileges with respect to psychiatrist-patient and psychologist-patient relationships are 
somewhat more inclusive, and their exceptions more narrowly drawn than the rule with 
respect to the physician-patient relationship. See CAL. EVID. CODE $8 1010-1028 (West 1966 
& Supp. 1977). In California, privilege statutes explicitly apply not only to licensed psychol- 
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always circumscribed by provisions that allow its breach under cer- 
tain conditi0ns,9~ these only permit disclosure, without requiring 
it, and leave to the professional's informed and conscientious judg- 
ment when they should be invoked. Mandatory reporting of confi- 
dential information traditionally has been confined to situations of 
immediate and objectively perceptible peril-typically child abuse, 
venereal or other highly contagious diseases, gunshot wounds, and 
conditions such as epilepsy, which may affect a patient's ability to 
drive safely. 
The Tarasoff court seemed to view disclosure of Poddar's threats 
in the same light. To psychiatrists, this is to ignore a basic distinc- 
tion between physical and psychiatric therapy: a gunshot wound or 
a venereal infection will respond to medication and care whether 
or not it is reported, but revelation of the fantasy or wish embod- 
ied in a threat may undo whatever has already been accomplished 
in the therapeutic relationship. A classic formulation of this point 
is found in the oft-cited case of Taylor v. United States:lo0 
Many physical ailments might be treated with some degree of 
effectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but 
a psychiatrist must have his patient's confidence or he cannot 
help him. . . ."The psychiatric patient confides more utterly 
than anyone else in the world. He exposes to the therapist not 
only what his words directly express: he lays bare his entire 
self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most 
patients who undergo psychotherapy know that this is what 
will be expected of them, and that they cannot get help ex- 
cept on that condition. . . . It would be too much to expect 
them to do if they knew that all they say-and all that the 
psychiatrist learns from what they say-may be revealed to 
ogists and clinical social workers, but also to school psychologists and to family and marital 
counselors. Id. a t  1010. 
See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE 5 1024 (West 1966 & Supp. 1977) ("There is no privilege 
under this article if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is 
in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or 
property of another and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the 
threatened danger."). For additional cases illustrating circumstances in which the duty of 
confidentiality may be qualied, see note 95 supra. 
loo 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
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the whole world from a witness stand."101 
The legislative history of a proposed psychotherapist-patient privi- 
lege statute in New York reflects a similar concern: 
This blanket privilege is premised on the need to protect con- 
fidentiality if patients are to make the communications re- 
quired in psychotherapy. By contrast, successful treatment of 
physical conditions seldom depends on the assurance of confi- 
dentiality, so a privilege is extended in such cases only to dis- 
closures which would tend to embarrass, humiliate, or dis- 
grace the patient.lo2 
B. Compromised Confidentiality 
1. Destruction of Trust 
Given the emphasis on complete candor as an essential element 
of effective psychotherapy, some writers have proposed that the as- 
surances of confidentiality offered by a therapist a t  the commence- 
ment of treatment should be coupled with quasi-Miranda warnings 
as to their limits, so that the patient's consent to treatment will be 
fully informed.los Psychiatrists argue that as patients are so ad- 
''' Id. at 401 (quoting M. GU~TMACHER & H. WEIHOPEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 
(1952)). Taylor had been found incompetent to stand trial and confined to the notorious St. 
Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington. When finally returned to stand trial, he raised an in- 
sanity plea. The prosecution called a hospital staff psychiatrist who testified that Taylor 
had told him he was malingering. Bassd on this breach of a statutory privilege and numer- 
ous other errors, the conviction was reversed. 
, 
PROPOSED CODE OP EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK 5 504 comment, at 78-79 
(West 1982). See also PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 504, 56 F.R.D. 240, 242 advisory committee 
note (1972) ("Among physicians, the psychiatrists had a special need to maintain confidenti- 
ality . . . . Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's awareness and in 
order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely. A threat to secrecy blocks suc- 
cessful treatment.") (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT NO. 46 
a t  92 (1960)). This rule was not enacted, and to date there is no independent federal physi- 
cian-patient or psychotherapist-patient privilege. For a thorough discussion of the physi- 
cian-patient privilege in federal practice, see LARKIN, FEDERAL T~STIMONIAL PRIVILEGES $5 
3.01-3.04 (1982). 
log See Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 
CALIF. L. REV. 1025, 1056-60 (1974); Sadoff, Informed Consent, Confidentiality and Privi- 
lege in Psychiatry: Practical Applications, 2 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 101, 105 
(1974). One commentator has expressed surprise a t  the prevalence of the uncritical assump- 
tion that the therapist must inform the patient that a breach of confidentiality might be 
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vised, and as the general public becomes aware of these limits, 
those perhaps most in need of counselling and restraint will be de- 
terred from seeking treatment a b  initio. People who do enter treat- 
ment may be reluctant to place complete confidence in their ther- 
apists,lO' and such reluctance could aggravate the repression that is 
at  the heart of their troubles.106 Successful psychotherapy is said to 
depend on the patient's ability to communicate without reserva- 
tion, which in turn requires a totally trusting relationship. 
One of the major objectives of a therapeutic program is helping 
the patient learn how to discharge violent impulses and to develop 
socially acceptable behavior instead of acting out. To do this, the 
patient first must be able to allow the violent impulses into his or 
necessary. See Dix, Tarasoff and the Duty to Warn Potential Victims, in LAW AND ETHICS 
IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 118 (C.K. Hofling ed. 1981). 
IM One study of uncertain validity was cited by Justice Clark, author of the Tarasoff 
dissent, to the effect that most people would be less open with a psychiatrist in the absence 
of a guarantee of confidentiality. See Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer 
and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 
YALE L.J. 1226,1255 (1962). See also Note, Imposing a Duty to Warn On Psychiatrists: A 
Judicial Threat to the Psychiatric Profession, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 293,308-09 (1977) 
(extension of Tarasoff doctrine will inhibit potential patients); California Senate Committee 
on Judicial Commentary on CAI.. EVID. CODE § 1014 (Law Revision Commission has received 
"several reliable reports that persons in need of treatment sometimes refuse such treatment 
from psychiatrists because the confidentiality of their communications cannot be assured") 
quoted in Grosslight v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 508, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278, 281 
(1977). For further discussion of Grosslight, see note 113 infra. 
One interesting recent study surveyed a random population sample, including both regu- 
lar patients and nonpatients of internists, in an effort to determine the role played by 
knowledge and attitudes about confidentiality in utilization of health-care services. The 
questionnaire responses indicated that a sizable minority of those who rarely visit a doctor 
claim to have been deterred from doing so in part by fear that confidential information 
would be divulged. About half of those who were regular patients reported significant con- 
cern about possible breaches of confidentiality, and roughly 10% of both groups stated that 
they had evidence of prior breaches of confidentiality by internists. As the researchers them- 
selves caution, this data is based on stated attitudes, not observed behavior, and major dis- 
crepancies between the two are likely. See Lindenthal & Thomas, Consumers. Clinicians 
and Confidentiality, 16 Soc. Scr. MED. 333 (1982). Compelling empirical data supporting 
the utilitarian justification for confidentiality and privacy in professional relationships have 
yet to be assembled. 
Io6 "Every person, however well-motivated, has to overcome resistances to therapeutic 
exploration. These resistances seek support from every possible source and the possibility of 
disclosure would easily be employed in the service of resistance." Goldstein & Katz, Psychi- 
atrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CONN. B.J. 
175, 179 (1962). 
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her own consciousness and then be able to reveal them to the ther- 
apist.lo6 The "duty to warn" could render this objective much more 
difficult to achieve. We must not underestimate the potential effect 
on the psychiatric patient of disclosing a threat: the patient's will- 
ingness to make the threat in the therapist's presence may presage 
or follow a critical breakthrough of suppressed anger. The thera- 
pist's warning to a third party, if discovered by the patient, may 
even trigger the feared violence as the patient "lives up to" the 
therapist's  expectation^.'^' Or the intended victim, hyperagitated 
by the warning, might preemptively strike or protectively overreact 
to the patient, precipitating needless tragedy.lo8 At the very least 
the therapist's disclosure will seriously undermine the entire thera- 
peutic relationship, perhaps precluding the establishment of any 
other relationship of trust: 
Confidentiality of communications . . . sets the stage for an 
exchange of thought, word and action at the emotional level. 
Without trust there can be no proper transference. In fact, 
the essence of much psychotherapy is the learning of trust in 
the external world by the formation of a trusting relationship 
with the .thefapist. This becomes the model for trust in the 
external world and ultimately in the self.lo9 
2. Concern about Group Therapy 
After the Tarasoff decision, psychiatrists seem to have become 
acutely sensitive to questions of confidentiality, speculating about 
even such an esoteric issue as the applicability of the Tarasoff rule 
in the context of group therapy.l1° Ordinarily, if anyone other than 
Io8 See Stone, supra note 56, a t  369. 
'07 See Brief of Amicus Curiae a t  40, Schneider v. Vine St. Clinic, No. 15344, 111. App. 
(4th Dist. 1979). See also Schneider v. Vine St. Clinic, 77 Ill. App. 3d 946, 397 N.E.2d 194 
(1979) (appeal of dismissal of complaint dismissed for failure to file timely notice of appeal; 
no reference to merits of case by appellate court). 
Io8 See Griffith & Griffith, Duty to Third Parties, Dangerousness and the Right to Re- 
fuse Treatment: Problematic Concepts for Psychiatrist and Lawyer, 14 Cm. W.L. REV. 241, 
254 (1978). 
lo* D. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRISTS 44 (1973). See also R. SLOVENKO 
& G. USDIN, supra note 6, a t  41 (1966). 
See S. HALLECK, supra note 8, a t  190. While i t  is unclear how well Tarasoff is 
known, or what is thought about i t  in the psychiatric community--see discussion in text 
accompanying notes 118-29 infra-there are some indications that i t  has had significant 
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therapist and patient is privy to a communication, its secrecy is no 
longer protected by law; the evidentiary privilege is destroyed. 
Furthermore, because the therapist-patient or physician-patient 
privilege is a creature of statute in derogation of the common law, 
it  usually is strictly construed.ll1 But most courts and some stat- 
utes include within the ambit of privilege those third parties who 
are necessary to accomplish the purpose of the treatment: nurses 
and interpreters, for e~ample."~ So it is not clear how the law will 
define the bounds of confidentiality if the claim is made that the 
others present-i.e., therapy group members-are intrinsic to the 
treatment process, in some sense members of the treatment team. 
No case directly deciding the issue has yet been reported. Still, 
some courts that have been asked to extend the privilege to mem- 
bers of a patient's immediate family have done and the rule 
of reason suggests that the privilege ought to be upheld. Confiden- 
tiality is just as essential to the therapeutic function in the group 
setting as it  is in the traditional dyad.l14 
impact. See Nugent, Murder Mystery by Psychiatrist Deals With Controuersial Confidenti- 
ality Issue, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY NEWS, Mar. 1982, a t  3-22 ("Because of the Tarasoff case 
. . . the issue of confidentiality is both timely and controversial . . . the Tarasoff case has 
changed the way psychiatry is practiced.") 
11' See, e.g., 8 WIGMORE, VIDENCE 3 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (citing Foster v. 
Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 89,97 (1831) ("the rule of privilege, having a tendency to prevent 
the full disclosure of the truth, ought to be construed strictly"). But see Roberts v. Superior 
Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330,337,508 P.2d 309,313,107 Cal. Rptr. 309,313 (1973) (psychotherapist- 
patient privilege to be liberally construed in favor of patient because of constitutional over- 
tones), and cases cited in note 96 supra. 
1' See, e.g., UNIF. R. EVID. Rule 27 (1953); CAL. EVID. CODE 3 1012 (West 1966 & Supp. 
1977). 
See Grosslight v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1977) 
(tort action against minor and against her parents for failure to control her; vacating order 
permitting in camera examination of psychiatric records, including communications of par- 
ents with hospital; held, privilege includes all relevant communications of intimate family 
members); Yaron v. Yaron, 83 Misc. 2d 276, 372 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (excluding 
from custody proceeding as privileged testimony and records of psychiatrist, social worker, 
and counselor jointly consulted by husband and wife); Ellis v. Ellis, 63 Tenn. App. 361,472 
S.W.2d 741 (1971) (privilege attaches to communications of patient's intimate family mem- 
ber to psychiatrist). But see In re Humphrey, 79 Misc. 2d 192,359 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Fam. Ct. 
1974) (admissions to social worker during joint consultation not privileged); Herrington, 
Privilege Denied in Joint Therapy, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, May 4, 1979, a t  1, col. 1. (in divorce 
proceedings, Virginia judge held unprivileged the disclosures of spouses in joint therapy 
with psychiatrist) (case name, court, and citation not given). 
Il4 For group therapy patients, 
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Could the therapeutic character of the group, the very quality 
that may compel recognition of its confidentiality, also impose on 
its members a Tarasoff obligation to disclose threats of violence? 
The short answer is that it should not. Group members neither 
assert nor are accorded the power to predict one another's future 
behavior. Nor can they utilize such predictions to instigate another 
member's institutional confinement. That remains the province of 
licensed professionals. 
3. Changes in Therapeutic Approach 
Tarasoff may have aggravated the tendency of some psychia- 
trists to resort more quickly to commitment of patients, not just 
because they fear liability for failure to bring about preventive de- 
tention, but because they see commitment as a less destructive al- 
ternative, preferable to violating the covenant of confidentiality.l15 
To these psychiatrists, revealing a patient's threat to its target, 
someone who may be a central figure in the patient's affective life, 
seems far more treacherous than an emergency hospitalization. 
Some patients might agree. One psychiatric clinic claims to have 
experimented successfully with the approach of explaining the 
therapist's dilemma and enlisting the patient's aid."= The patient 
is asked either to enter a secure facility voluntarily-once an inpa- 
treatment is inexorably linked to completely frank self-disclosure in an environ- 
ment that accepts their confidences without qualification and holds them inviolate 
to outsiders. It would seem that a mutual trust is inherent in the sort of multilat- 
eral soul-baring that occurs in group sessions. . . . If this trust cannot be estab- 
lished, many patients will discontinue therapy and others will be unable to make 
worthwhile contributions to the group. 
Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants in Group Psychotherapy, re- 
printed in MEDICINE, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 371, 376 (N. Kittrie, H. Hirsh, & G. Wegner 
eds. 1975). See also Slovenko, Group Psychotherapy: Privileged Communication and Confi- 
dentiality, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 405 (1977); Note, Group Therapy and Privileged Commu- 
nications, 43 IND. L. J. 93 (1967). A psychologist reports one case in which a member of a 
therapy group disclosed statements of another member and the former brought suit for 
breach of confidentiality against the group psychologist. The case was dropped in exchange 
for the psychologist's forgiving his bill. See R.J. COHEN, MALPRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR MENTAL 
HWTH PROFESSIONALS 147 (1979). (Case #5.71--case name, court, and citation withheld). 
See, e.g., Stone, supra note 56, a t  374-75. 
See Roth & Meisel, Dangerousness, Confidentiality and the Duty to Warn, 13 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 508, 509 (1977). 
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tient, his or her status can more easily be converted from voluntary 
to involuntary if necessary-or to give the therapist permission to 
contact the victim. The voluntariness of the "consent" in these cir- 
cumstances is open to question, but a t  least the therapist is ac- 
knowledging and appealing to that part of the patient's personality 
which is responsible and still capable of choice. And the honest 
admission of the therapist's conflict and need is a refreshing note, 
one that might even enhance rather than detract from the har- 
mony of the therapeutic relationship. 
David Wexler, the mental health law specialist, has pointed out 
that Tarasoff could have a profoundly salutory effect if it leads 
therapists to heed the insights of v ic t im~logy.~~~ A now well estab- 
lished subdiscipline of interactionist psychology, victimology holds 
that conflict analysis must include the factor of the victim-not 
necessarily as an agent provocateur, but as a contributor to the , 
tension that ignites into violence. Tarasoff will perhaps induce 
therapists to expand their frame of reference and to try to involve 
in treatment the most likely objects of their primary patient's 
homicidal impulses. Such involvement improves the chances of ac- 
complishing substantial change in the patient's life. Tarasoff-con- 
scious therapy, Wexler suggests, may turn out to be more effica- 
cious therapy. 
It is fair to ask, however, how relevant the "patient-consent" and 
"victim-involvement" responses to the Tarasoff ruling are to the 
onerous task of treating patients who have been accused or con- 
victed of criminal violence-a large subpopulation, one would 
guess, of the universe of potentially "dangerous" patients. Critics 
of the decision contend that therapists' will become more hesitant 
than they already are to undertake the treatment of such patients. 
Particularly with respect to them, the profession's newly conceded 
bias toward the overprediction of violence can only have been rein- 
forced by Tarasoff. 
117 See Wexler, The Tarasoff Case and the Controversy over Its Therapeutic Implica- 
tions, in &NTAL HEALTH LAW: MAJOR ISSUES 157, 174-76 (1981). 
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C. The Effects of Tarasoff on Role Conflict 
Psychiatrists believe that their professional territory has been 
invaded by a legal system ill-equipped to oversee the delicate cal- 
culation of risk and benefit, both individual and social, involved in 
deciding whether to violate a patient's trust. The California Su- 
preme Court concluded that despite "professional inaccuracy in 
predicting violence" and "the risk of unnecessary warnings," "the 
public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental illness 
and in protecting the rights of patients to privacy" was outweighed 
by "the public interest in safety from violent assault." "The pro- 
tective privilege ends where the public peril begins."l18 But will the 
deleterious impact of Tarasoff on the practice of psychotherapy 
promote more violence and greater suffering than it will prevent? 
The court dismissed the claim that its ruling would result in a net 
increase in "public peril" as "dubious" and "~peculative."~~ At  the 
time of the Tarasoff decision, neither the psychotherapist amici 
nor the court cited any convincing empirical evidence concerning 
the degree of harm that a duty to breach confidentiality might en- 
tail for private, and, indirectly, public, health and safety. 
1. An Empirical Study 
In the six years since, only one study of the actual effect of 
Tarasoff on the attitudes and practices of the California psycho- 
therapists who have been living with it has been published.120 (An- 
other survey of over a thousand therapists is reportedly in pro- 
gress.121) Although the results cannot be accepted as definitive, 
since they are based on the return of mailed questionnaires from 
only a third of a random sample of state licensed psychologists and 
members of the California Psychiatric A~sociation,'~~ they do indi- 
cate that some change of uncertain magnitude has occurred. Of 
Tarasoff v. Regents of  the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,442,551 P.2d 334,347, 131 
Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976). 
"* Id. at 440 n.12, 551 P.2d at 346 n.12, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.12. 
Ia0 See Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Deter- 
mine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165 (1978). 
la' See Appelbaum, Tarasoff: An Update on the Duty to Warn, 32 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 14 (1981). 
Iaa See Note, supra note 120, at 173-74. 
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this self-selected and therefore dubiously representative subset of 
therapists, all but an insignificant number had heard of the 
Tarasoff case, and almost nine in ten reported having discussed 
the case with other members of their profe~sion.'~~ One quarter of 
them claimed to have noticed increased reluctance to talk about 
violence among those patients who had been advised of this poten- 
tial exception to the rule of confidentiality.12' An equal proportion 
reported "losing" a patient who feared the possibility of such a 
breach.125 While a small percentage stated that they now feel 
tempted to avoid probing into areas related to the subject of vio- 
lence altogether, many others are spending more clinical time and 
attention than before on exploring propensities for violence in 
their patients.126 
Deficient as its methodology is, the survey nevertheless suggests 
that California therapists have revised the criteria by which they 
evaluate the seriousness of voiced threats, and that they tend to 
give such threats more credence. A substantial number of respon- 
dents claim to feel greater anxiety when material related to vio- 
lence surfaces in the course of treatment, and a similar number 
feel increased concern about becoming objects of lawsuits because 
of their uncertainty about the parameters of the duty to warn.12' 
Almost a fifth of those who responded to the questionnaire believe 
that the Tarasoff ruling applies to threats of suicide.128 They are 
apparently unaware that the one California appellate court con- 
fronted with that issue to date declined to so extend the rule.129 
laS Id. at 177 nn.68-69. 
la' Id. a t  177. 
a t  177 n.67. 
la6 Id. at 181, 182 n.87. 
la' Id. a t  181. 
Id. a t  178. 
See Bellah v. Greenson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 892,141 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1977), modified on 
rehearing, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 620-21, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 539-40 (1978). Their confusion 
may in part be attributable to the publicity generated when a suit was filed on behalf of the 
family of comedian Freddie Prinze, who committed suicide after his psychiatrist returned to 
him a gun and tranquilizers. See Kirsch & Kasindorf, Is Suicide Ever the Doctor's Fault? 
NEW WEST, NOV. 21,1977, a t  15. Another determination limiting the scope of Tarasoff duty 
was made by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Coles v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1981). 
Presented with the claim of a patient against her psychiatrist for negligently failing to pre- 
vent her from murdering her husband, the court wasted little time in rejecting the claim. 
Heinonline - -  31 Emory L. J. 313 1982 
314 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31 
2. Advising a Therapist 
Of particular interest are the data suggesting an increase in the 
practice of consulting an attorney when faced with a Tarasoff 
problem. A lawyer may feel no little anxiety about advising a ther- 
apist-client on the appropriate course of action in such a case.I3O 
Should the lawyer assume that the California precedent will be 
found persuasive by the courts of his or her own state? If so, what 
particular variation on the theme might they adopt? How certain 
is the therapist-client that the patient will act to effectuate the 
threat, and how is the lawyer supposed to judge the validity of that 
opinion? What if there has been no express threat, but the thera- 
pist nevertheless has an uneasy sense that the patient's anger is 
ready to erupt into violence? 
The Tarasoff double bind would become a paralyzing reality for 
the lawyer. If disclosure or preventive detention is recommended, 
the client's patient conceivably could join the lawyer as codefend- 
ant with the therapist in a suit for breach of confidentiality and 
fiduciary duty, or perhaps even for false imprisonment. At  least 
one suit against a therapist has already been brought by a disgrun- 
tled patient whose confidentiality had been vi01ated.l~~ If the law- 
yer counsels instead that the therapist maintain confidentiality 
"We have not adopted the rationale in Tarasoff. If we were to do so i t  would not control the 
question here." Id. a t  768. The court held that the Tarasoff duty runs only to intended 
third-party victims, not to  the patient. 
ls0 That this imagined reaction is not utterly idiosyncratic was corroborated by a talk 
with one California lawyer who has been consulted twice in three years by a therapist with a 
Tarasoff problem. Interview with Deborah Sanders, Esq. (Nov. 3, 1981). In both instances, 
the lawyer found i t  difficult to judge the substantiality of the risk, since the patients appar- 
ently expressed ambivalence and qualified their destructive urges even as they revealed 
them. In each case, the therapist had already tried to have the patient admitted voluntarily 
to an institution without success, due to a local shortage of beds. The commitment attempts 
compounded the problem, since they could subsequently have been seized upon as proof 
that the therapist considered the patient to be extremely dangerous, although the attorney 
was well aware that simple decompensation and loss of ego control are also indications for 
hospitalization. Both episodes eventually were resolved without injury to anyone, but the 
lawyer found them disquieting. 
Is' See Appelbaum, supra note 121, a t  15; Sinimons, Issues Raised by Tarasoff Case 
Confusing to Psychiatrists, Courts, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY NEWS, Oct. 1981, a t  1. See also 
Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 415 A.2d 625 (1980) discussed in text accompanying 
notes 165-70 infra; Note, Psychotherapists' Liability for Extrajudicial Breaches of Confi- 
dentiality, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061 (1976); cases cited in note 96 supra. 
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and the threat subsequently materializes, the patient's victim or 
his or her survivors could file suit. While as a general rule third- 
party nonclients cannot sue a lawyer for malpractice, in certain cir- 
cumstances such actions have been successfully prosecuted.132 
There is definitely a trend in some jurisdictions to hold attor- 
neys responsible to third parties who suffer from their negligence, 
taking into account the extent to which the transactions involved 
were intended to protect or benefit those harmed and the foresee- 
ability of that harm.133 California is one of the more liberal states 
in this regard; New ~ d r k  has been more resistant to the trend, so 
far.13' Attorneys in several states have been held liable to people 
lS1 The leading Supreme Court case on the subject, National Savings Bank v. Ward, 
100 U.S. 195 (1879), requires a direct fiduciary relationship between the injured party and 
the lawyer sought to be held liable for negligence, except in cases of fraud and collusion, a 
breach of duty to the general public, or "imminently dangerous" situations. A Tarasoff situ- 
ation might well be considered "imminently dangerous!' 
lSa See Probert & Hendricks, Lawyer Malpractice: Duty Relationships Beyond Con- 
tract, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 708 (1980); Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, 57 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 126 (1982) (attorneys should be held to standard of due care with regard to 
third parties foreseeably injured by their negligence); Note, Attorneys' Liability to Third 
Parties for Malpractice: The Growing Acceptance of Liability in the Absence of Priuity, 21 
WASHBURN L.J. 48 (1981) (trend toward rejection of privity requirement, allowing third par- 
ties to recover on both tort and contract theories). For a state-by-state summary of authori- 
ties, see R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 33 57-59 (1977). 
la' See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583,364 P.2d 685,15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (attorney 
could be held liable to would-be beneficiary of testator in absence of privity; but, not negli- 
gence to fail to draft will in accord with Rule Against Perpetuities), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
987 (1962); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (public policy balancing 
test of foreseeability should replace privity as limit of duty); Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 
3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971) (third-party creditor could sue lawyer for negligence in 
pursuit of collection agency claim). Cf. Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S.2d 
672 (Sup. Ct. 1973), a r d ,  43 A.D.2d 1021,351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (App. Div. 1974) (absent privity 
of contract, no liability to putative beneficiary for failure to prepare new will); Maneri v. 
Aurodeo, 38 Miic. 2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (attorney not liable to third 
party unless fraud, collusion, or malicious or tortious act other than simple negligence). See 
also Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778,386 N.E.2d 821,413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978), reinstat- 
ing, 89 Misc. 2d 171,391 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (physician countersuit against attor- 
ney for bringing "frivolous" malpractice action; held, attorney not liable to third parties for 
negligent performance of obligation to client even if negligence results in damage to third 
parties). But see Baer v. Broder, 106 Misc. 2d 929, 935-36,436 N.Y.S.2d 693, 696-97 (Sup. 
Ct. 1981) (court permitted executrix who had brought wrongful death action to sue, in her 
individual capacity, attorney for negligence, and noted that it was "time to embrace the 
California rule . . . the citadel of privity is not invulnerable to the assault made upon it in 
this case"), aff'd on other grounds, 447 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1982); Singer v. Whitman & 
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who sustained financial losses from faultily drafted wills, even 
though it was the testator-client, not the potential beneficiary, who 
had relied on and paid for the attorney's professional judgment.136 
Dictum in a leading California case implies that if an attorney im- 
properly advises a client concerning the discharge of an obligation 
to one with whom the client has an ongoing fiduciary relationship, 
that attorney may be sued by either party.136 A Tarasoff case could 
logically be encompassed in that category. The therapist-client ob- 
viously has a fiduciary relationship with the patient and, following 
Tarasoff, may be considered to owe a special duty to the potential 
victim of a patient. Advice to the therapist surely could be con- 
strued as intended to protect and benefit both the patient and the 
putative victim, as well as the therapist. 
In theory a lawyer can no more be penalized for an honest mis- 
take of judgment within the bounds of the "standard of the profes- 
sion" than can a therapist for a similarly wrong but reasonable 
choice. In reality the prospect of an accusation of professional mis- 
conduct or incompetence evokes nearly as much fear as an actual 
Ransom, 83 A.D.2d 862, 442 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div. 1981) (holding that a New York law 
firm owed a duty of care to a nonclient shareholder in a corporation which had retained the 
firm); Estate of Douglas, 104 Misc. 2d 430,428 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Surr. Ct. 1980) (although New 
York cases continue to require privity, contrary trend may be emerging; applying balancing 
test, attorney not liable to trustee and beneficiary with whom not in privity). 
See, e.g., Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (Conn. C.P. '1966); 
McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Shideler v. Dwyer, 386 N.E. 
2d 1211 (Ind. App. 1979); Succession of Killingsworth, 292 So. 2d 536 (La. 1974); Guy v. 
Liederbach, 280 Pa. Super. 134, 421 A.2d 333 (1980). 
IJ%oodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335,556 P.2d 737,134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (hold- 
ing purchasers of securities from corporate officers who had been incorrectly advised by 
their attorney that the stocks could be sold without affecting their tax exemption could not 
sue attorney, since plaintiffs were not intended to benefit from attorney's advice to client 
and advice was not given to enable corporate officers to discharge obligation to plaintiffs). 
See also Roberta v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baenvitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104,111,128 Cal. 
Rptr. 901, 906 (1976) (issuance of opinion letter to client, knowing it would be shown to 
creditors to induce loan, held negligent because "a legal opinion intended to secure a benefit 
for the client, either monetary or otherwise, must be issued with due care, or the attorneye 
who do not act carefully will have breached a duty owed to those they attempted or ex- 
pected to influence on behalf of the client") (emphasis added). Cf. Prescott v. Coppage, 266 
Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1972) (attorney liable to preferred creditor for loss suffered from 
incorrect distribution of assets by attorney's client, receivor of debtor); United Leasing 
Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400,263 S.E.2d 313 (1980) (holding lessor could sue lawyer for 
failure to discover lien on property used by clients as collateral for lease). 
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imposition of liability. The time and energy consumed by involve- 
ment in litigation; the pressure often exerted by a malpractice in- 
surer to settle quickly, regardless of fault, in order to avoid an ex- 
pensive trial defense; the publicity attendant on the institution of 
the suit, whatever the outcome-all combine to eliminate the sol- 
ace of any ultimate ~indicati0n.l~~ Considering the risk of misjudg- 
ment and the complexity of the law in this area, lawyers might be 
wise to take refuge in asserting sheer lack of ability to give proper 
advice-acknowledging the limits of their expertise, as it 
were-and to simply refuse to discuss a Tarasoff problem with any 
therapist who tries to consult them.13s More timid souls can only 
salute the intrepid attorneys who have contracted with the Ameri- 
can Psychiatric Association to offer a prepaid legal consultation 
program to its members, who now can call a toll-free phone num- 
ber for unlimited advice on "all aspects of .  . . practice" including 
"~onfidentiality."~ NO doubt everyone is well-insured. 
V. THE EVOLUTION F THE Tarasoff Doctrine 
A. Two Subsequent Cases 
1. No Explicit Threat Admitted 
The professional insecurity generated by the Tarasoff decision 
clearly will not be restricted to California psychotherapists and 
their lawyers. The first of what may be called Tarasoff's progeny 
arrived on June 12, 1979, in the form of McIntosh v. Milano,140 a 
New Jersey lower court decision still on appeal. Though the facts 
of McIntosh bear startling similarity to those of Tarasoff, there are 
lS7 While in a certain karmic sense lawyers have less standing than other professionals 
to complain of the distress entailed in defending a malpractice action, our suffering may be 
all the more acute because of our familiarity with the process. The ability to foresee from 
the outset just how protracted, inconvenient, and unpleasant an experience will be is at best 
a mixed blessing. 
Is The only other option would seem to be giving conditional advice, coupled with an 
agreement that the therapist will indemnify the lawyer should the advice prove faulty. This 
approach might well be considered an unethical attempt to limit liability for malpractice, 
which is prohibited with regard to clients. See ABA CODE, supra note 24, DR 6-102 (''A 
lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for his 
personal malpractice."). 
lSs APA Prepaid Legal Consultation Program, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Dec. 18,1981, at 15. 
168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979). 
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significant differences. The patient, Lee Morgenstein, was a seven- 
teen-year-old boy who had been in therapy for two years for 
problems associated with drug abuse and adolescent adjustment 
reaction. JustYprior to beginning therapy, Morgenstein apparently 
had been sexually involved with a young woman, Kimberly McIn- 
tosh, who lived next door. The affair, such as it was, had ended, 
but the boy continued to suffer from feelings of possessiveness, 
jealousy, and hatred for the men who had replaced him in 
Kimberly's affections. Morgenstein confided to his psychiatrist, Dr. 
Milano, certain "fantasies of magical power and violence,"141 but 
never made a direct threat against his eventual victim. However, 
he had engaged in some fairly aggressive behavior, including firing 
a BB gun at  her car, and had once shown the doctor a knife that 
he had bought "to scare people away."142 
On the critical day, Morgenstein tried to obtain s e ~ o n a l l ~ ~  with a 
stolen prescription blank. When a suspicious pharmacist contacted 
the psychiatrist, Dr. Milano instructed him to let the boy go home, 
where the doctor tried, but failed, to reach him. By mischance, 
Kimberly, who had moved away from her parents' house, returned 
to visit them that very evening. Morgenstein convinced her to go 
for a walk to a nearby park. There he shot her. 
The McIntoshes sued Dr. Milano on a Tarasoff theory, claiming 
that he had been negligent in not warning them of the danger 
Morgenstein posed to their daughter. The trial court found the 
facts of their complaint sufficient to defeat the psychiatrist's mo- 
tion for summary judgment, holding that a therapist (not necessa- 
rily a psychiatrist) may be required to take steps to protect a po- 
tential victim from a "dangerous" patient. Comparing this duty to 
that of a physician who discovers that a patient is contagious, the 
court suggested that its ruling was based as much on the general 
responsibility of the medical profession to community welfare as 
la Id. at 476, 403 A.2d at 505. 
14' Id. at 473,403 A.2d at 503. 
Second is a brand of barbiturate which depresses the central nervous system and is 
used as a sedative, sometimes for chronic insomnia. It is habit-forming and interacts danger- 
ously with other central nervous system depressants like alcohol. The manufacturers caution 
against prescribing it in quantity for patients who have a history of emotional disturbance, 
suicidal ideation, or substance abuse. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1092-93 (35th ed. 1981). 
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on any "special relationship" of therapist and patient.144 
In some ways,. this result seems more palatable than that of 
Tarasoff. Dr. Milano had been treating the boy for two years and 
knew of at least one overt act of aggression that Morgenstein had 
directed against his victim. But in terms of foreseeability-the 
keynote of the Tarasoff decision-how could anyone have antici- 
pated Kimberly's coincidental return home? Is there any reason 
that Dr. Milano should have concluded from the boy's behavior 
that day that he was likely to erupt into violence, particularly in 
the absence of an explicit threat? Dr. Milano, unlike Poddar's 
therapist, had made no effort to have his patient committed. Does 
that bespeak negligence, or does it indicate rather that the psychi- 
atrist did not believe the boy to be dangerous? 
2. Discovering the Basis for a Tarasoff Suit 
Dr. Milano's crucial mistake may have been less in his therapeu- 
tic judgment and more in his subsequent attempts to help his pa- 
tient."& At Morgenstein's criminal trial, Dr. Milano testified in the 
boy's defense.146 During that testimony, he admitted that when a 
patient did seem dangerous, it was his practice to "look into it" 
and sometimes to contact a third party close to the patient.14? In 
the civil suit, plaintiff used this testimony to good effect, and the 
court characterized it as an implicit concession of a Tarasoff 
In fact, as the court noted, the civil suit was "based in 
large part" on Milano's testimony in Morgenstein's trial.149 
Were it not for that testimony, one may wonder whether the 
14' McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 489-90, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (1979). 
Undoubtedly, another critical error was the state of some of the doctor's reports, 
which contained detectable deletions and additions tending to minimize the patient's desire 
for revenge and intention to retaliate against his ex-girlfriend. Id. a t  475 n.6,403 A.2d at 504 
n.6. 
Id. at 471, 403 A.2d at  502. Morgenstein was convicted of first-degree murder, and 
was sentenced to life imprisonment, but the conviction was reversed on appeal due to im- 
proper and prejudicial statements by the prosecutor during the trial. At the time of the 
McIntosh decision, the Morgenstein case still had not been finally resolved. Id. at 470 n.1, 
403 A.2d at 502 n.1. 
"'Id. at 489, 403 A.2d at  511. 
us Id. 
"* Id. a t  476, 403 A.2d at 505. 
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McIntoshes would ever have had a clue that their daughter's killer 
had expressed fantasies of violence to his doctor. It strains credu- 
lity to believe that a therapist would volunteer such information to 
a potential plaint8 who had been injured by a patient. In those 
states in which it is privileged, this information would be essen- 
tially undiscoverable, unless the patient waived the privilege with 
respect to communcations during treatment-presumably a rare 
occurrence when such communications include an explicit and sub- 
sequently consummated threat. In most states which recognize a 
therapist-patient privilege, it can be waived either explicitly, by 
the patient's consent or calling the therapist as a witness, or im- 
plicitly, by the patient's placing his or her state of mind in issue 
(for example, by raising an insanity defense a t  a criminal trial). 
Once waived for any reason, the privilege no longer obtains.lSO Un- 
less it has been waived, however, the therapist is not merely enti- 
tled but legally bound to assert the privilege if a potential plaintiff 
tries to depose or interview the therapist.lS1 
One intermediate appellate court in California has ruled on a re- 
quest to produce psychiatric records in the absence of patient con- 
160 See, e.g., People v. Garaux, 34 CaL App. 3d 611,110 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1973) (psycho- 
therapist-patient privilege waived in second case by patient's having called therapist to tes- 
tify in first case); UNIF. R EVID. 27(7) (1953); 8 J.H. WIGMORE, VIDENCE $$ 2389-2390 (Mc- 
Naughton rev. 1961). 
lm Even when the privilege has been implicitly waived, a doctor is not supposed to 
disclose patient confidences without the patient's express authority. See Hammonds v. 
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793,805 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (mere waiver of privilege 
does not release a doctor from duty of loyalty to patient; should not permit unsupervised 
conversation with adversary); Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Mi. 405,240 N.W.2d 333 (1976) 
(public policy precludes private interview of opponent's physician); Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 
Misc. 2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582 (recognizing causes of action against both a doctor who 
discloses patient confidences and an insurer who, in the course of investigating a lawsuit, 
induces the doctor to do so), afd, 73 kD.2d 589,422 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Alexan- 
der v. Knight, 197 P a  Super. 79,177 k 2 d  142,146 (1962) ("members of a profession, espe- 
cially the medical profession, stand in a confidential or fiduciary capacity as to their pa- 
tients. They owe their patienta more than just medical care for which payment is exacted; 
there is a duty of total care; that includes and comprehends a duty to aid the patient in 
litigation, to render reports when necessary and to attend court when needed. That further 
includes a duty to refuse aflknative assistance to the patient's antagonist in litigation. The 
doctor, of course, owes a duty to conscience to speak the truth; he need, however, speak only 
at  the proper time"). See also Committee on Professional Ethics of Bar Ass'n of Nassau 
County, New York, Op. No. 82-2, reprinted in N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1982, at 26 (attorney may 
not privately interview adverse party's physician without party's express consent). 
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sent or waiver. In Mavroudis v. Superior Court,162 the petitioners 
sought the records in order to ascertain whether there were 
grounds to sue the therapist under a Tarasoff theory. The court 
struggled to find some way to bring the requested material within 
the definition of California Evidence Code 5 1024,16s although, as 
the court admitted, a literal reading seems to limit that provision 
to permitting disclosure when necessary to prevent prospective 
harm, not in a court proceeding long after the threatened danger 
has been realized. The court devised a somewhat contorted proce- 
dure to govern both the instant request and future ones. First, a 
judge would review the psychiatric records in camera to determine 
if the plaintiffs had been "readily identifiable as victims."164 Only 
if that threshold of relevance were reached would the same judge 
then decide whether the patient had "posed a serious danger of 
violence . . . and [whether] disclosure of confidential communica- 
tions [had been] necessary to prevent that threatened danger."lB6 
Although this decision is to be made in accordance with "the stan- 
dard of the profession," Mavroudis suggests that in some cases a 
judge could resolve the issue without the benefit of expert assis- 
tance. When a court perceives the need for such assistance, how- 
ever, it should appoint an independent expert instead of relying on 
one retained by a party to the action.166 
The in camera procedure does not differ greatly from the stan- 
dard method of resolving privilege claims. But because of the 
unique characteristics of a Tarasoff claim, the procedure could 
present a distinctive problem in such cases. Finding the patient's 
communications to the psychiatrist unprivileged is virtually 
equivalent to ruling that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie 
case of tort liability. Under the statute's terms, the court would 
have to conclude that the psychiatrist had reasonable cause to be- 
lieve that the patient's conditions presented a danger requiring 
disclosure to thwart. Such a predetermination on the merits can 
lo' 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1980). 
CCA Em. CODE 3 1024 (West 1966 & Supp. 1977), quoted at  note 99 supra. 
lo' Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 605, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724, 733 
(1980). 
ISO Id. 
Ioe Id. at  605, 162 Cal. Rptr. a t  732-33. 
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have prejudicial ramifications for a defendant.lU7 More significant, 
however, is the irreparable harm done when a judge reviews a pa- 
tient's records only to discover no basis for abrogation of the privi- 
lege. Requests to invade the privacy of the therapeutic relationship 
with judicial scrutiny must not be granted routinely on a showing 
of no more than an assault committed by someone who is or has 
been in psychotherapy. Whether the facts of Mavroudis are suffi- 
cient to justify such an invasion is arguable. The petitioners in 
Mavroudis may have evoked greater sympathy than would the av- 
erage assault victim fishing for grounds to file a lawsuit, since they 
were the patient's parents, whom he had attacked and seriously 
wounded with a hammer. 
B. An Unanticipated Consequence of the Tarasoff Rule 
Legal doctrine and court decisions, like medical interventions, 
sometimes have undesirable consequences that were neither in- 
tended nor anticipated by those respon~ib le .~~~  For instance, a 
troubling side effect of the liability that Tarasoff imposes on psy- 
chiatrists may be to render them even more reluctant than they 
previously were to cooperate in criminal proceedings against a pa- 
tient accused of assault or murder, for fear of furnishing ammuni- 
tion for a civil suit. In this connection it is noteworthy that the 
defendant-therapists in Tarasoff testified on Poddar's behalf a t  his 
criminal trial, substantiating his defense of diminished capacity.lUD 
Although it is not possible from the case reports to ascertain the 
temporal relationship between that testimony and the initiation of 
the civil suit, one may fairly speculate that the therapists' testi- 
mony did not have a pacifying effect on the Tarasoffs. 
See generally Note, Discovery of Psychotherapist-Patient Communications after 
Tarasoff, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 265 (1978). 
lW Any examination of the sociological phenomena of "unanticipated consequences" 
must start with Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 
AM. SOC. REV. 894 (1936). See generally S. SIEBER, FATAL REMEDIES: THE IRONIES OP SOCIAL 
INTERVENTION (1981); UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL ACTION: VARIATIONS ON A SO- 
CIOLOGICAL THEME (R.K. Merton ed. in press). 
16@ See People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 759 n.13, 518 P.2d 342, 348 n.13, 111 Cd. 
Rptr. 910, 916 11.13 (1974) (both psychiatrists and the psychologist who had participated in 
Poddar's therapy testified). 
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Since there is no legal obligation to provide information or an- 
swer questions, other than under oath in response to a judicially 
enforceable summons,1e0 therapists concerned about possible 
Tarasoff liability might be well-advised simply to refuse to discuss 
with a patient's lawyer anything that transpired in the course of 
therapy-even if the erstwhile patient begged them to do so-no 
matter what essential element of the defense they might be in a 
position to supply. A recalcitrant therapist could of course be sum- 
moned to testify before a grand jury, a t  a pretrial hearing, or a t  
trial. Even in those jurisdictions which recognize it, the psycho- 
therapist or physician-patient privilege may not be applicable in 
criminal proceedings.lB1 Grand jury testimony, however, ordinarily 
remains unavailable to the defense unless and until the witness 
testifies a t  trial.ls2 The defense lawyer might have a legitimate ba- 
sis for calling the therapist to the stand, for example, a t  a pretrial 
hearing on the voluntariness of a statement allegedly made by the 
defendant. Or at  trial, the patient could choose to waive the privi- 
lege and thus require the doctor to testify. But competent defense 
counsel likely would not take such steps without some notion of 
what the doctor would say. No lawyer wants to put on the stand a 
loo See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL, & M. MILLER, TRIAL M~NUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF 
CRIMINAL CASES 5 116, a t  1-101 (1978); K. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS IN A NUT- 
SHELL 228 (1978) ("witnesses are not legally obligated to talk to you"). Cf. New York County 
District Attorney Witness Aid Service Unit, Your Rights as a Witness in a Criminal Pro- 
ceeding, 113 ("If you choose to speak to anyone other than the ADA concerning a pending 
matter, you may answer any questions asked of you or you may decline to answer any ques- . 
tions") (sic) (improperly suggesting that the witness has no choice about speaking to the 
ADA). See, e.g., United States v. White, 454 F.2d 435 (7th Ci. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 
962 (1972) (witnesses free to decide whether to grant or refuse lawyer a pretestimonial inter- 
view) (citing Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185,188 (D.C. Ci. 1966), cert. denied, 396 
U.S. 865 (1969), and United States v. Bowens, 318 F.2d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 1963)). Accord 
United States v. Mirenda, 443 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 966 (1971). 
See akro People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311,406 N.E.2d 771,428 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1980) (absent 
specific legislative directive, or a command or request for assistance by law enforcement 
officials, citizen has no obligation to volunteer exculpatory information to law enforcement 
authorities) and cases cited therein. 
See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK F THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 33 103-104 (E. Cleary 
2d ed. 1972). 
IaP See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 3 3500 (1969); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 16(a)(3) (1966). Material 
evidence favorable to the defense should be disclosed prior to trial pursuant to United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), but prosecu- 
tors' and defense attorneys' interpretations of "favorable" have been known to d ie r .  
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witness whose testimony is an unknown quantity. Particularly in 
the delicate area of expert opinion, unpredictable responses from a 
noncooperative, though not demonstrably hostile, witness could be 
devastating. The elementary maxim, "never ask a question without 
knowing what the witness will answer" cannot always be honored, 
but it is not departed from lightly. Ideally, a trial lawyer engages in 
extensive preparation of witnesses, in accord with a definite strat- 
egy and .an overall theory of the case.1e3 
True, a psychiatrist's records generally would be obtainable by 
subpoena and if explicit enough might embolden the attorney to 
seek the live testimony, notwithstanding the fact that many psy- 
chiatrists (and other physicians) have become highly circumspect 
in what they include in discoverable treatment records. The point 
is that a therapist concerned about potential Tarasoff liability is 
not going to be a very helpful partner in the development of an 
effective defense. It is not hard to imagine a case in which the re- 
sult could be a miscarriage of justice. This possible consequence of 
Tarasoff seems a t  least as serious as the one so frequently alluded 
to in the literature: the deterrence of therapists from undertaking 
the treatment of potentially violent patients. The McIntosh court 
disposed of that issue in short order, asking, "If the psychiatrist 
claims inability to predict dangerousness or detect a dangerous 
leS See, e.g., A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL, & M. MILLER, supra note 160, $5 106-119 at 1-96 
to 1-104 (1978); T. mum, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES $ 1.5 at  11 (1980); ALI- 
ABA C O M ~  ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, CIVIL TRIAL  MANUAL 385-91 (R. 
McCullough & J. Underwood 2d ed. 1981); OFFICE OF PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT, APPELLATE 
DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, FIRST DEP'T, CRIMINAL TRIAL 
ADVOCACY 431-33 (4th ed. 1980). See akio Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 
1976) (failure to interview witnesses prior to trial can be construed as negligence and inepti- 
tude in trial preparation and might constitute malpractice if it causes client's loss); People 
v. Droz, 39 N.Y.2d 457, 348 N.E.2d 880, 384 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1976) (failure to investigate and 
contact witnesses, along with other questionable conduct, held to constitute ineffective assis- 
tance of counsel) (unanimous bench); New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional 
Ethics, Op. 245 (1972) (lawyers permitted to interview adverse witnesses, since failure to 
investigate facts could be considered a dereliction of duty); ABA STANDING C O M M I ~  ON 
ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE--THE DE- 
FENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1980) (duty of defense counsel to investigate care- 
fully all  available defenses of fact and of law; defense attorney should interview not only 
own witnesses but also accessible prosecution witnesses and should try to secure information 
from prosecutor and police). See generally G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PRO- 
CESS 339-407, 676-92 (1978). 
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person, how will he make the determination to weed out 'poten- 
tially violent patients'?"le4 
C. In  Other Jurisdictions 
The courts of several other jurisdictions have been asked to im- 
pose Tarasoff liability on psychotherapists. In Maryland, a dentist 
named Shaw sued a husband-wife psychiatric team who had simul- 
taneously been treating Shaw, his mistress, and her husband (a sit- 
uation that may have been in the best interactionist-therapy tradi- 
tion but seems ethically problematic). One night the estranged 
husband caught his wife and Shaw in jlagrante delicto and fired 
five bullets into him. Shaw survived and had the audacity to file 
suit not only against the by-then divorced husband, who eventually 
paid him $20,000, but also against the psychiatric team, claiming 
that he should have been warned of the husband's "unstable and 
violent condition" which presented a "foreseeable and immediate 
danger."le6 During discovery it developed that on the day of the 
assault the wife had heard from her son, and had relayed to Shaw, 
the information that her husband was "acting in a bizarre way" 
and carrying a The trial court granted the defense motion 
for summary judgment, concluding that under the circumstances, 
the proximate cause of Shaw's injuries was his own assumption of 
risk in going to bed nude with the wife of a distraught and armed 
man.le7 
On appeal, the reviewing court affirmed the result but did not 
endorse the lower court's reasoning. It distinguished Shaw's posi- 
tion from that of the Tarasoffs because he had failed to allege in 
his complaint that his assailant had ever communicated to the de- 
fendant-therapists an intention to kill or injure Shaw. (Considering 
that the husband must have been aware that the other two mem- 
bers of this folie h trois were also patients, his reticence is not sur- 
prising). Absent that allegation, the court found no cause of ac- 
IM McIntOsh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 493, 403 A.2d 500, 514 (1979). 
le6 Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 721, 415 A.2d 625, 628 (1980). 
lee Id. at 721, 415 A.2d at 627. 
Ie7 Id. at 722, 415 A.2d at 628. 
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tion.les The court then went on, quite gratuitously, to quote the 
Hippocratic Oathlee and to declare that had the psychiatric team 
revealed to Shaw the husband's vengeful propensities, they would 
have violated the state's privilege statute. This construction is 
hardly self-evident, since the statute as written appears applicable 
only to judicial proceedings, not to private comm~nication.'~~ The 
court did not comment on alternative courses of action to disclo- 
sure. Whether it intended to signal a covert rejection of the 
Tarasoff principle is difficult to determine. Those Maryland psy- 
chotherapists who are aware of the court's opinion must find it 
frustratingly opaque. 
Altogether clear in its holding, although less so in its reasoning, 
is the opinion of the federal district court in Lipari v. Sears, Roe- 
buck & Co.171 In that case the court was called upon to deduce 
whether Nebraska courts would require psychotherapists to "initi- 
ate whatever precautions are reasonably necessary to protect po- 
tential victims" of their patients.lq2 The plaintiffs had claimed that 
Veterans Administration therapists were negligent in their treat- 
ment of a psychiatic outpatient who took a shotgun on a shooting 
spree in a crowded Omaha nightclub, killing plaintiffs' decedent. 
Applying Nebraska law in accord with the Federal Tort Claims 
the court characterized Tarasoff and McIntosh as providing 
a "just and reasoned analysis" of the issues and expressly adopted 
their holdings.17' The court was careful to emphasize that the 
Tarasoff standard could be met by taking "those precautions 
which would be taken by a reasonable therapist under similar 
lea Id. a t  725, 415 A.2d at  630. 
leg "All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession . . . which 
ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and never reveal!' Id. a t  725,415 A.2d at 
630. 
Id. a t  727 n.9, 415 k 2 d  at  630 n.9, (citing MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 5 9- 
109(b) (1974) ("Unless otherwise provided, in all judicial, administrative or legislative pro- 
ceedings, a patient or hi authorized representative has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and 
to prevent a witness from disclosing, communications relating to diagnosis or treatment of 
the patient's mental or emotional disorder!') (emphasis added). 
I7l Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980). 
17' Id. 
17= 28 U.S.C. 5 1346(b) (1976 West & Supp. 1980). 
17' Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 189 (D. Neb. 1980). 
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On the facts of this case, it is not clear whom the therapists were 
expected to warn, or what precautions they could have taken other 
than committing their patient. The relevance of Tarasoff and Mc- 
Intosh is not apparent; plaintiffs' decedent was hardly a "readily 
identifiable" potential victim.176 Perhaps the court as a matter of 
public policy wished to avoid finding the hospital negligent for fail- 
ing to commit an outpatient,17? but its decision seems just as likely 
to create an incentive for Nebraska therapists to resort to 
commitment. 
In Leedy v. Hartnett,178 a Pennsylvania federal district court 
had to decide what position the courts of that state would take in a 
case of first impression. The defendants in this case were also Vet- 
erans Administration psychiatrists. Hartnett, a disabled veteran 
and alcoholic with a history of violence, had signed himself out of 
the hospital where he was a voluntaiy patient and had gone to live 
with the plaintiffs, who generously had offered him a home. About 
six months later, Hartnett attacked his hosts and gave them an 
unprovoked beating. The victims sued the hospital for having 
failed to apprise them, not of a threat, but of Hartnett's assaultive 
tendencies. Taking an inventive approach to the issue of foresee- 
ability, the plaintiffs contended that the hospital ought to have re- 
alized that they comprised a "readily identifiable" target of Hart- 
nett's violence, based on the statistical probability that the more 
one was in contact with him, the more likely one was to become his 
victim.170 The court assumed that Pennsylvania courts would en- 
tertain a Tarasoff theory of liability, but that to keep it within 
"workable limits" it could not be extended to cover the facts of a 
case such as this.lsO Only when a particular victim can be identified 
in advance is there good reason to impose a duty to warn, held the 
Id. at 193. 
'le See Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1980); 
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 88 Cal. App. 3d 936, 152 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1979). 
l7"ee, e.g., Centeno v. New York, 48 A.D.2d 812, 369 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1st Dep't 1975), 
aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 932 (1976), quoted at note 61 supra. 
l7"10 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981). 
17* Id. at 1130. 
lSO Id. 
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Finally,lS2 in an unreported Illinois decision, an intermediate Illi- 
nois court refused to follow Tarasoff and upheld the dismissal of 
plaintiffs complaint against a clinic, a psychiatrist, and a social 
worker for failing to warn their patient's family of his express in- 
tention to "kill rich people."183 The court may have been swayed 
by the fact that the statutory strictures on professional breaches of 
confidentiality which were in effect a t  the time plaintiffs decedent 
was murdered contained no exceptions for notifying anyone, not 
even the patient's family, of suspected danger. (A subsequent en- 
actment has given providers of mental health-care the discretion- 
ary power to disclose a "clear, imminent risk of serious physical or 
mental injury."1s4) Too, the court may have found the plaintiffs 
ISl Id. 
9 
18' For a more recent incident occurring in New York that received a great deal of 
publicity, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 12,1980, a t  C3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 19,1979, at  B1, col. 
6; N.Y. Times, Dec. 9,1979, a t  50, col. 1. The articles include frequent reference to possible 
Tarasoff liability, but the situation is not comparable to the Tarasoff case. Adam Berwid, a 
"model" patient a t  Pilgrim State Psychiatric Hospital, had been judicially committed fol- 
lowing threats to kill his ex-wife. He was given a day's furlough on December 6, 1979-the 
second anniversary of his divorce-and promptly went to his ex-wife's home and stabbed 
her to death. The next day Berwid called the police and ourrendered. Subsequently, the two 
psychiatrists associated with the decision to grant furlough were subjected to disciplinary 
proceedings by the State Department of Mental Health and threatened by the Nassau 
County District Attorney with criminal prosecution, although reportedly the Nassau County 
grand jury refused to indict them. See N.Y. Times, June 20, 1980, a t  B2, col. 1. 
Predictably, the incident led to demands for legislative enactment to require notification 
of courts and law enforcement officers whenever "potentially dangerous" patients are fur- 
loughed, and in 1980 New York's Criminal Procedure Law was amended to prohibit the 
discharge, conditional release, or even transfer to a less secure facility or status, of anyone 
found incompetent to stand trial on a criminal charge, without four days' prior notice, not 
only to local police and prosecutors, but to "any person who may reasonably be expected to 
be the victim" of the committed person. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 5 730.60(6)(a)(5) (McKinney 
Supp. 1981-1982). See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 5 730.60 supplementary practice commen- 
taries (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). 
The Berwid case is not a true Tarasoff situation. Any civil liability predicated on these 
facts would not require aflimation or adoption of a Tarasoff duty by New York courts. 
Rather, i t  would derive from the longstanding and accepted principle that one with a custo- 
dial relationship to a previously-diagnosed dangerous pernon can be held responsible for acts 
of violence committed after that person's negligent release. See note 61 supra and accompa- 
nying text. There was obviously no issue of disclosure of a confidentially communicated 
threat, since Mrs. Berwid was well aware of her ex-husband's desire to kill her. 
See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Schneider v. Vine St. Clinic, supra note 107, at  2. 
IM Id. a t  49-50. 
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theory of proximate causation a bit farfetched. The plaintiffs the- 
ory presumed that the patient's family and the patient's personal 
physician, had they been warned by defendants about the patient's 
statement, would have tried to hospitalize the patient; that their 
efforts would have been successful, and that the hospitalization 
would have prevented the murder. 
VI. A Tarasoff DUTY FOR OTHER PROFESSIONS 
A. A Lawyer's Duty to Disclose 
1. The Proposed Model Rule 
It may be some consolation to psychiatrists embroiled in the 
"no-win" conflict between their traditional role of confidant and 
their new role of informant to learn that the legal profession, sua 
sponte, is on the verge of placing its members in a similar double 
bind. Lawyers, like psychiatrists, have always had the discretion to 
reveal a confidential communication in order to avert future harm 
to another.lS5 The relevant provision of the Model Code of Profes- 
sional Responsibility permits a lawyer to reveal "the intention of 
his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to pre- 
vent the crime."lS6 This has been interpreted, however, to allow 
la' Unlike many therapists' codes, the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY is 
also explicit in giving lawyers discretion to reveal a confidence in order to avert harm to 
themselves: in defense to an accusation of misconduct or malpractice or in order to collect a 
fee. ABA Code, supra note 24, DR 4-101(c)(4). See Levine, Self-Interest or Self Defense: 
Lawyer Disregard of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Profit and Protection, 5 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 783 (1977). This provision haa been interpreted to allow lawyers to breach confidential- 
ity even when the charge of misconduct comes from a third party, not from the client. See 
Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Ci. 1974), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 998 (1975). Under the PROPOSED MODEL RULES, supra note 24, this exception is 
described as narrowed to "situations where the client's conduct was involved," which does 
not seem all that much more narrow. Rule 1.6, Notes: Code Comparison. Arguably, the 
Tarasoff doctrine can be viewed as based on anticipating an accusation of misconduct or 
malpractice; if lawyers are permitted to disclose client confidences in order to defend them- 
selves, why not in order to forestall such accusations? The circular nature of this reasoning 
should be apparent. You could be held responsible for failing to tell, therefore you are enti- 
tled to tell to protect yourself, therefore you ought to teli; if you ought to tell and do not, 
you can be held responsible. 
laa ABA CODE, supra note 24, DR 4-101(c)(3). In addition, DR 7-102(b) appears to 
require lawyers to reveal confidential information in order to rectify client fraud, but its 
1974 amendment and its construction in ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsi- 
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violation of a confidence only if "the facts in the attorney's posses- 
sion indicate beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime will be com- 
mitted."lS7 That standard probably would not b'e met by the cli- 
ent's merely stating an unlawful intention. Most attorneys would 
require a more substantive indication of danger to overcome their 
reluctance to violate the rule of confidentiality. 
The exceptions to that rule have been fiercely debated within 
the profession during the major reconstruction of the Code now in 
progress. The first Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Profes- 
sional Conduct provided that: A lawyer shall disclose information 
about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the 
client from committing an act that would result in death or serious 
bodily harm to another person, and to the extent required by law 
or the Rules of Professional Conduct.lS8 
Were that rule or some other quasi-Tarasoff standard of conduct 
for lawyers to be adopted by the courts, a host of problems parallel 
to those experienced by psychiatrists would emerge. Clearly there 
is no "standard of the profession" which even the most exper- 
ienced attorney can realistically use as a basis to discriminate be- 
tween the empty threat and the truly ominous one. Clients in vari- 
ous kinds of legal trouble frequently make irrational and 
regrettable statements that could be interpreted as threats. 
Whatever their other sins, lawyers have never promulgated the no- 
tion that they have the ability to detect a predilection for violence 
in clients. I, for one, cannot imagine assessing with any degree of 
accuracy how genuine a threat is represented when a client mutters 
"I oughta take care of that guy" in reference to an opposing party 
or witness. I have heard such comments on occasion, and beyond 
advising the client that such conduct would be the height of self- 
destructive folly as well as a vicious and criminal act, I have done 
nothing. (To my knowledge no violence ever ensued). Many of 
bility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) have all but eliminated that effect in those states which have 
adopted it. See generally Kramer, Client's Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations: A 
Study in Professional Irresponsibility, 67 GEO. L.J. 991 (1979). 
Ia7 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965). 
lea Discussion Draft, PROPOSED MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 1.7(b) (emphasis 
added). 
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these clients stood accused, and in the past had been convicted, of 
violence and lawlessness. If anything is a reliable indicator of a real 
potential for violence, according to our psychiatric colleagues, it is 
previous violent behavior. It is troubling to think that my failure 
to act may have endangered ag innocent person. Yet I can see no 
reliable way to ascertain the difference between the routine and 
the deadly remark. 
At this point, while recognition of a Tarasoff duty for lawyers 
remains an abstract possibility, I can comfortably assert that I 
would not sacrifice my clients' interests by reporting statements 
that might increase their chances of conviction, for threatening an 
accuser could serve as convincing evidence against an accused. 
However, fear of civil liability and professional sanction might well 
lead some attorneys, particularly those who rarely handle criminal 
matters and are unfamiliar with the pattern of casually uttered 
threats, to overcome their sense of obligation to their clients and to 
disclose those threats, since under present law they have the dis- 
cretion, although no duty, to do so. They might recall that before 
Tarasoff, psychiatrists also had little reason to suspect that their 
professional discretion would be converted into actionable duty. 
What about a case similar to McIntosh or Shaw in which no ex- 
plicit threat was made? The language of the originally proposed 
Rule of Professional Conduct was not limited to statements by cli- 
ents, but was framed in terms of "information about" them. Would 
it be sufficient justification for disclosure to know that a client is 
violently angry at or possessive of an estranged spouse, and 
secretly wishes the latter would "die a thousand painful deaths," 
as a client in a matrimonial action once told me? Warning the cli- 
ent's spouse of such suspicion, if it came to the attention of the 
court, could cost the client a considerable sum of alimony, not to 
mention its effect on a child-custody arrangement. If the lawyer 
had misjudged the situation, the client might have an excellent 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty or even malpractice.lse 
See Citizens State Bank v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375,386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (dic- 
tum that violation of the ABA CODE, supra note 24-attorney revealing to wife confidential 
communication of client husband--could constitute basis for malpractice claim). But see the 
disclaimer in the Preliminary Statement of the ABA CODE, supra note 24 : "The Code [does 
Heinonline - -  31 Emory L. J. 331 1982 
332 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31 
The widespread consternation in the bar over the Discussion 
Draft apparently persuaded the Kutak Commission to beat an or- 
derly retreat. The Final Draft of the Proposed Model Rules defines 
the exceptions to the lawyer's obligation of confidentiality as 
purely permissive-not mandatory.lBO Candidates for discretionary 
disclosure include those criminal or fraudulent acts which "the 
lawyer believes . . . likely to result in death or substantial bodily 
harm, or substantial injury to another's financial interest or prop- 
erty of another."lB1 Unfortunately, in its comment on the lawyer's 
responsibility with respect to this broad category, the Commission 
chose to justify its volte-face with reference to that perennial shib- 
boleth, scienter. The Commission explains that lawyers would find 
it difficult to "know" whether a client's heinous purpose will be 
carried out because the client "may always have a change of 
mind."lB2 That formulation seems practically to beg for the psychi- 
atrists' retort: How, then, are we supposed to "know" when our 
patients are dangerous? Our patients are just as likely as your cli- 
ents to repent their threats. Instead of this excursion into episte- 
mology and the vagaries of human nature, the Kutak Commission 
could have based its position on one simple proposition: lawyers 
lack the expertise to predict client behavior and, unlike psychia- 
- - 
trists, lawyers have never acted as if they had such expertise. 
The Commission also stated that it did not want fear of profes- 
sional discipline to enter into lawyers' resolution of this "inher- 
ently difficult moral dilemma."1Bs What is puzzling about this ob- 
servation, aside from the not uninteresting question of when 
ethical principles might better be invoked, is that the Commis- 
sion's Comment also appears to contemplate circumstances in 
which a lawyer's failure to prevent a client's injury to a nonclient 
not] undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct." Cf. 
PROPOSED MODEL RULES, supra note 24, at 3 ("violation of the Rules should not necessarily 
result in civil liability. . . . The Rules . . . may have relevance in determining civil liability, 
but they should not be uncritically incorporated into that context."). 
loo See PROPOSED MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 1.6, at 37-38. A proposal at the 
August 1982 ABA House of Delegates convention to reinstate the mandatory disclosure re- 
quirement was resoundingly defeated. See Taylor, supra note 24. 
Is' See PROPOSED MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 1.6, at 37-38. 
lo2 Id. 
IBS Id. at 39. 
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could be the predicate for tort liability.'s4 It seems improbable that 
the lawyer who might be induced to disclose client confidences pre- 
maturely or unnecessarily by a threat of disciplinary sanction 
would hesitate longer if the only risk involved were exposure to 
civil suit. If the Commission's concern is to preserve unhampered 
professional discretion, it might better have questioned the legiti- 
macy of imposing quasi-Tarasoff liability on a lawyer instead of 
appearing to lend the theory credence. 
2. The Dangerous Defendant 
In the only reported decision on a claim against an attorney 
comparable to that of the Tarasoffs, a Washington court granted 
summary judgment to the defendant.lS6 Curiously, the case in- 
volved a psychiatric prediction of "dangerousness." The attorney 
was charged with having failed to disclose at  a bail hearing that he 
had been told that his client was mentally ill and dangerous. The 
sources of this information were a lawyer and a psychiatrist in the 
employ of the client's mother, who was trying to bring about her 
son's civil commitment. The client, in jail on a marijuana charge, 
had told the attorney that he wanted to get out; the attorney pro- 
ceeded to apply for his release on personal recognizance, an appli- 
cation that was granted. It is not clear why the mother or her 
agents did not attend the hearing and, through the prosecutor, 
contest the application, since the attorney had made his intentions 
plain. The client's mother was informed of his release. Eight days 
later, the boy assaulted her and then attempted suicide. He sur- 
vived, a t  the cost of an amputation of both legs. His mother 
brought suit both on his and on her own behalf, alleging malprac- 
tice based on a violation of ethical responsibility as well as on the 
common law duty to warn foreseeable victims. 
lM "When the threatened injury is grave, such as homicide or serious bodily injury, the 
lawyer may have an obligation under tort or criminal law to take reasonable preventive 
measures." Id. Concern about precisely this issue was expressed by the Special Comm. of 
the New York State Bar Ass'n in its report recommending that the PROPOSED MODEL RULES 
not be adopted. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW ABA DRAFT MODEL 
RULES OF PROPESSIONAL CONDUCT at 15-17 (1981). 
le6 See Hawkins v. King County Dep't of Rehabilitation Sews., 24  ash.'^^^. 338, 602 
P.2d 361 (1979). 
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In its analysis, the court assumed without deciding that the psy- 
chiatric opinion provided to the attorney was not only unprivileged 
but also neither a confidence nor a secret within the meaning of 
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(a).1e6 Technically, the attorney could have 
presented that opinion to the court without breaching an obliga- 
tion of confidentiality; but to an old-school, adversarially trained 
lawyer, the very idea seems preposterous. As the court noted: "We 
believe that the duty of counsel to be loyal to his client and to 
represent zealously his client's interest overrides the nebulous and 
unsupported theory that our rules and ethical code mandate dis- 
closure of information which counsel considers detrimental to his 
client's stated interest."lS7 
After taking this straightforward stance, the court's subsequent 
painstaking effort to distinguish Tarasoff is somewhat mystifying. 
First, the court said, perhaps not entirely accurately, that in 
Tarasoff, the victim had been "wholly unaware of her danger,"lB8 
while here the victim knew all about her son's condition. Second, 
the Berkeley therapists' information came from their patient; here 
the attorney's information was third-hand.lSe If anything, that 
would seem to undercut the lawyer's obligation to keep silent, in 
terms of confidentiality; in terms of reliability, however, the court 
may have had a point. Finally, the court bootstrapped its finding 
of no ethical duty by emphasizing that an ethical duty to disclose 
could apply only to that which an attorney was "required by law" 
I" Id. a t  364. 
Iw Id. a t  365-66 (emphasis added). Whether or not a lawyer is a t  all concerned for the 
welfare of anyone other than the client, the lawyer who perceives some reason not to accept 
a client's statement a t  face value for the client's sake experiences considerable conflict. Un- 
like psychiatrists, lawyers do not usually feel capable of probing the ultimate meaning be- 
hind such a statement. To  some extent, lawyers take refuge in this incapacity; i t  is almost, 
in Veblen's phrase, a "trained incapacity," see T. VEBLEN, THE INSTINCT OP WORKMANEHIP 
347 (1914), a lack of skill which paradoxically simplifies and streamlines getting the job 
done. Increasingly, however, lawyers are paying attention to this dimension of their work. 
See, e.g., Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1979); ShaEer, 
The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAMP, LAW. 231 (1979); Spiegel, Lawyer- 
ing and Client Decision Making: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. 
REV. 41 (1979). 
IS8 Hawkins v. King County Dep't of Rehabilitation Sews., 24 Wash. App. 338,343-44, 
602 P.2d 361, 365 (1979). 
loo Id. 
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to disclose.200 Since the court did not recognize a legal duty, a la 
Tarasoff, to disclose the psychiatrist's opinion, the theory of liabil- 
ity based on ethical duty could not be sustained on these facts. But 
in dictum, the court did suggest that a common law duty to volun- 
teer information to a court considering pretrial release of a client 
might exist if the attorney were convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that "the client has formed a firm intention to inflict serious 
personal injuries on an unknowing third person."201 
The disquieting implication of this suggestion is that a success- 
ful defense attorney might in some circumstances be held responsi- 
ble for a client's future crimes. The judge who grants the bail ap- 
plication is immune;202 the prosecutor who fails to argue for or 
achieve the defendant's continued incarceration is also privileged 
by Neither of them owes the defendant loyalty or confi- 
dentiality; both have an obvious duty to' the public. But the sole 
function of the defense lawyer is to try to persuade the court to 
free the client. What sense does it make to impose liability on the 
defense lawyer and not on the other part?~ipants?~O~ 
Id. a t  343, 602 P.2d a t  365. 
Id. 
so' On the extent of judicial immunity, see, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 
(1978) (minor sterilized without her consent, based on judicial approval of parents' petition 
in ex parte proceeding with no semblance 'of due process; held, judges not civilly liable for 
judicial acts, even when acts were in excess of authority, done maliciously, or erroneously) 
See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,553-54 (1967) ("few doctrines . . . more solidly estab- 
lished a t  common law than the immunity of judges from liability . . . for acts committed 
within their judicial jurisdiction"). 
'OJ See, e.g., Seibel v. Honolulu, 61 Hawaii 253, 602 P.2d 532 (1979), in which the Ha- 
waii Supreme Court took pains to distinguish Tarasoff in affirming a lower court's dismissal 
of a suit against a prosecutor for failing to report a serious breach by a convicted violent sex 
offender of the terms on which he had been conditionally released. Sce generally Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (review of historical development of common law rule of 
prosecutorial immunity and public policy considerations dictate holding state prosecutor 
acting within scope of duties absolutely immune from § 1983 suit, even when prosecutor 
knowingly used perjured testimony or deliberately withheld exculpatory information). 
aM The defense lawyer is hardly devoid of moral guilt when a client commits another 
crime. We cannot brag about our acquittals and exult in the heady sensation of "walking 
someone out1'-and we do-without also partaking of some responsibility for what follows, 
anymore than a prosecutor can wholly disavow the injustice when an innocent person suffers 
a false accusation. This immense and complex subject simply cannot be tackled in this pa- 
per; all that I can try to point out is the incoherence of attempts to extend legal liability to 
lawyers in this situation. Perhaps in an extraordinary case-if a lawyer actively misrepre- 
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3. The Suicidal Client 
Since the Hawkins case involved transmission of someone else's 
opinion that a client was "dangerous," the court avoided address- 
ing the question of when, if ever, lawyers should be expected to 
rely on their own predictions of "dangerousness," an opinion which 
nothing in their professional training or experience enables them 
to call more than conjecture, an opinion which probably would not 
even be admissible in, for example, an involuntary commitment 
hearing.206 One New York court, in dictum, has suggested that in 
extreme circumstances lawyers may be expected to act on such 
judgments.20s The facts of that case were somewhat more emotion- 
ally charged for the lawyer than those in Hawkins. At 2 a.m., Al- 
bert Fentress called his long-time friend Wallace Schwartz, a law- 
yer in civil practice, to announce that he had just killed someone 
sented to the court that the client had never mentioned harming a particular individual, 
when the client had been threatening that person for the duration of the lawyer-client inter- 
view-liability might be appropriate. Even then, however, we must keep in mind the inter- 
vening causal factors-principally the judge who actually orders release. There is likewise a 
profound difference between the court-appointed psychiatrist who recommends release and 
the court-appointed attorney who argues for it. One presents an opinion and claims to have 
made an objective judgment; the other takes a forthrightly subjective position and presents 
whatever reasons can be found to support it. Again, the lawyer speaks for clients, not dis- 
passionately about them. And unlike the psychiatric witness whose testimony in a commit- 
ment proceeding is almost always diipositive, see authorities cited in note 47 supra, the 
lawyer's impact on the judge's decision is limited because the judge is usually well aware of 
the purpose underlying all that the lawyer says. Yet psychiatrists who render such opinions 
have been accorded the absolute immunity of judges and prosecutors from liability for an 
erroneous expert opinion that results in the release of a "dangerous" individual who subae- 
quently harms another. See Seibel v. Kemble, 631 P.2d 173 (Hawaii 1981) (holding court- 
appointed psychiatrist absolutely immune) and authorities cited therein. See also Seibel v. 
Honolulu, 61 Hawaii 253,602 P.2d 532 (1979) (case, mentioned in note 203 supra, has same 
plaintiff and facts as in Seibel v. Kemble, 631 P.2d 173 (Hawaii 1981)). 
But see Esquivel v. Texas, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Among the sev- 
enteen grounds urged in this appeal of a capital murder conviction and death sentence was 
the admission during the penalty phase of the trial of the opinion of a former district attor- 
ney who had prosecuted the defendant for rape some twenty-five years previously. The wit- 
ness, based on his knowledge of the defendant's prior criminal record, predicted that he 
would commit future offenses and pose a continuing threat to society. The appellate court 
finding no error, stated that objections to the witness' lack of qualifications for making a 
prediction of future violence went to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence, and 
suggested that an experienced prosecutor might be just as competent to render such an 
opinion as a psychiatrist after an average forensic interview. Id. a t  527-28. 
People v. Fentress, 103 Misc. 2d 179, 425 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Dutchess Cty. Ct. 1980). 
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and was about to take his own life. Schwartz coped tolerably well, 
all things considered, and attempted to obtain for Fentress some 
immediate aid and comfort. (Schwartz lived some fifty miles 
away). Through a complex chain of phone calls, the police were 
alerted and Fentress was taken into custody, along with his vic- 
tim's body and his gun. Saved from suicide, he would stand trial 
for intentional homicide. 
The germane issue before the court was whether the attorney's 
breach of confidentiality had immunized his client from prosecu- 
tion, since all the evidence presented to the grand jury that in- 
dicted him flowed from that initial breach. The court managed to 
avoid this unpalatable result by emphasizing the intervening inde- 
pendent variables, principally a colorable waiver on Fentress' 
part.207 The court could not, however, take the client's communica- 
tions out of the privilege entirely. The "future crime" exception 
did not apply; suicide is not a crime in New Y ~ r k . ~ ~ ~  Nonetheless, 
the court's dissection of the attorney's trilemma culminated in 
these observations: 
The ethical oath of secrecy must be measured by common 
sense. . . .To exalt the oath of silence, in the face of imminent 
death, would, under these circumstances, be not only morally 
reprehensible, but ethically unsound. As Professor Monroe 
Freedman reminds us, "At one extreme, it seems clear that 
the lawyer should reveal information necessary to save a life." 
[citations omitted] . . . Thus, even if [Fentress] flatly forbade 
Schwartz from calling the police, the ethical duty of silence 
would be of dubious operability. . . . Had [Schwartz] acted 
any differently, he would have blindly and unpardonably con- 
verted a valued ethical duty into a caricature, a mockery of 
1°'Id. a t  194-96,425 N.Y.S.2d a t  494-96. Despite the fact that Schwartz had "never for 
a moment envisioned himself as being Fentress' attorney," id. a t  187, 425 N.Y.S.2d a t  491, 
the court concluded that he had been consulted in his professional capacity, and therefore 
an attorney-client relationship had been formed. Id. "That Wallace Schwartz was in effect 
called upon to serve as psychologist, therapist, counselor, and friend, does not derogate from 
his role as lawyer [cit. omit.]." Id. a t  190, 425 N.Y.S.2d a t  492. 
lo8 Id. a t  197-98, 425 N.Y.S.2d a t  497; see also New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on 
Professional Ethics, Op. 486 (1978) (lawyer may take appropriate action to prevent client 
suicide, including disclosure of client intentions even though suicide does not fall into the 
category of "future crimes"). 
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justice and life itself.20D 
Would the court have declaimed in similar fashion had the law- 
yer kept his counsel, Fentress gone ahead and shot himself, and 
the lawyer been sued for failing to prevent his death? Possibly yes. 
The court found the underlying justification for the duty of confi- 
dentiality in the protection of client interests, and then asked: 
"What interest can there be superior to the client's life itself?"a10 
The question sounds uncannily like that of a physician whose pa- 
tient's refusal of lifesaving treatment has just been upheld as com- 
petent by an anti-paternalistic court. In contrast, consider the rea- 
soning of the Bellah court which, following Tarasoff, would not 
countenance a psychiatrist's violation of confidentiality unless it 
were necessary to prevent harm to others. That court held that a 
threat to hurt oneself could not authorize, let alone require, disclo- 
sure.211 Perhaps the courts are in the process of developing a bilat- 
erally symmetrical division of professional responsibility: lawyers 
will be held liable for failing to prevent client suicides, but not 
their homicides, while psychiatrists can be sued for patient homi- 
cides, but not their suicides. 
4. Statistical Risks 
There is another category of conflict between third-party inter- 
ests and patient or client rights which certain lawyers are likely to 
experience but most psychiatrists are not. In the world of corpo- 
rate and commercial practice, attorneys may often find that their 
clients' business decisions present an increased risk to the health 
and safety of some statistically predictable, though not individu- 
ally identifiable, set of consumers, employees, or members of the 
public. The paradigm of this conflict is (mercifully) a hypothetical 
concocted by Judge Ferren of the D.C. Circuit. Known to legal- 
ethics buffs as the "~rireme Case," it  centers on the Trireme Alu- 
minum Company, which has recently become profitable through its 
Pw People v. Fentress, 103 Misc. 2d 179, 197-98, 425 N.Y.S.2d 485,497 (Dutchem Cty. 
Ct. 1980). Invoking Monroe Freedman in support of disclosure of client confidences is cer- 
tainly citing the strongest authority imaginable. 
=lo Id. 
Bellah v. Greenson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 911, 141 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1977). 
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sales of an aircraft alloy. The alloy, despite having passed all the 
required safety tests, has a tendency to crack a t  high altitudes. As- 
sured of this by the company's chief engineer, speaking for the en- 
tire engineering st&, Trireme's counsel informs the company pres- 
ident and board of directors. They disagree with the chief 
engineer, insist that there is no problem worth recalling the prod- 
uct, and veto any notion of going public with the news. A month 
later, a plane made with the alloy crashes, killing all aboard. It is 
not certain that the alloy is to blame. The government investiga- 
tion begins and counsel is called upon to represent Trireme's inter- 
ests. The company wants to continue to conceal evidence of defects 
in the alloy. Should the lawyer reveal the evidence? 
Judge Ferren concluded, after an exhaustive analysis of the cur- 
rent Code of Professional Responsibility and the relevant ABA 
opinions, that it was by no means clear that the attorney had the 
right, let alone the duty, to disclose.212 According to the original, 
broadly worded Proposed Model Rules, disclosure would seem to 
be in order; but the final version, which constrains lawyers to re- 
veal only criminal or fraudulent acts likely to result in injury, 
might well not support discl0sure.2~~ Can a lawyer predict death or 
injury with greater reliability in this context than when an individ- 
ual client threatens a wife or a witness? If we follow the reasoning 
of the Tarasoff line of cases, the fact that the victims in this in- 
stance are not "readily identifiable9'-that the client's actions pose, 
if anything, a generalized danger to the public-would preclude an 
attempt to hold the lawyer responsible if injury did occur.214 The 
car manufacturer who chooses to economize on safety equipment, 
the government official who launches a counter-insurgency opera- 
tion or revokes a safety regulation, the megafarmer who fattens 
stock on diethylstilbestrol-each is probably some lawyer's client 
and they all probably discuss their intentions with their lawyers in 
"' See Ferren, supra note 24, at 1262, 1264. 
%IS See PROPOSED MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 1.6(b)(2), Note, Exceptions to 
Confidentiality at 47 (when failure to disclose prospective crime or fraud may result in sub- 
stantial harm, disclosure discretionary; mandatory disclosure "limited to circumstances in 
which the lawyer's conduct is inextricably bound to the client's misconduct, for example, 
assisting fraud . . . upon a tribunal"). 
'I4 See note 74 supra. 
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advance. A Tarasoff rule for lawyers that did not limit the universe 
of potential plaintiffs to identifiable individuals could lead to legal 
malpractice premiums that would eclipse the neurosurgeons'. 
B. No  "Draconian Dilemma" for Law Enforcement 
Ironically, the imposition of a Tarasoff rule has been considered 
only with respect to the helping professions whose obligations of 
confidentiality it threatens most. The effort to extend Tarasoff to 
members of the one profession whose mandate is public protec- 
tion-law enforcement-has been unsuccessful. The argument that 
it is no less reasonable to create an incentive for police officers to 
prevent anticipated and avoidable violence than it is to create a 
similar incentive for psychotherapists has not prevailed. Unless ev- 
idence is proffered that the person injured had justifiably relied on 
a specific promise to provide special protection, the police are not 
held liable.216 
Recently a wrongful death action was brought against an Ari- 
zona police officer.216 The man whom he was questioning had ex- 
plicitly told the officer that he had firearms and, in the officer's 
opinion, recorded at  the time, "gave . . . the impression that he 
might resort to violence."217 The officer did nothing but fill out a 
form and leave. Fifteen minutes later, that man shot and killed 
another, whose family subsequently sued. The action was dis- 
missed because: "A police officer in a field situation should not 
have to resolve the dilemma of whether to make a preventative 
detention which might turn out to be a false arrest, or not to do so 
and risk a tort suit for later  consequence^."^^^ 
The Arizona court followed Tarasoff's lead in declaring that the 
decisive factor was the lack of a "special relationship" between the 
police and either the killer or the decedent--such as a relationship 
See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 449-50, 551 P.2d 334, 
352-53, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32-33 (1976). See also Henderson v. Petersburg, 247 So. 2d 23 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972) (dictum); 
Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1982). 
See McGeorge v. Phoenix, 117 Ariz. 272, 572 P.2d 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). 
Id. a t  274 n.1, 572 P.2d a t  102 n.1. 
s'B Id. a t  277, 572 P.2d a t  105. 
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created by a promise of protection to the decedent, or by prior cus- 
todial responsibility for the killer.219 Adherence to this traditional 
rule has somewhat paradoxical effects. It may be true, for example, 
that a therapist generally has access to more information about a 
patient than a police officer has about a temporary detainee. Yet 
the courts seem to say that even a police officer who has been in- 
formed by a therapist that someone is dangerous-as in 
Tarasoff-or who actually formed that opinion from personal ob- 
servation-as in the Arizona case-risks no liability for a failure to 
act on that information. On the other hand, a therapist who did 
not perceive a patient to be dangerous-as, perhaps, ,in McIn- 
tosh-is exposed to the possibility of suit. 
This outcome makes little sense unless the Tarasoff duty rests 
exclusively on a claimed and recognized ability to predict violent 
behavior-an ability the police do not officially assert, although in 
some quarters their hunches may be regarded as a t  least as reliable 
as psychiatric expertise. The term "special relationship," as used 
by the Arizona court and in Tarasoff, must be understood to refer 
to, in addition to the two classic categories of tort law already 
mentioned, a relationship in which one party's power over the 
other is derived from that party's supposed talent for predicting 
"dangerousness." In the evolution of the limits of the Tarasoff 
principle, attorneys, who are quite innocent of such pretension and 
devoid of such power, should properly be classified with other of- 
ficers of the law, not with psychiatrists. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is reason to suspect that the Tarasoff doctrine, as it  takes 
shape through the common law, will exacerbate psychiatric role 
conflict and compromise loyalty to patients while achieving little in 
the way of compensatory ojectives. If its application were confined, 
as Judge Mosk suggested, to situations in which a psychotherapist 
actually had predicted a patient's violence and then failed to 
act-avoiding, in the judge's choice phrase, "the wonderland of 
clairvoyance"220 -it would produce a somewhat more incremental 
Id. at 277, 572 P.2d at 105-06. 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,452,551 P.2d 334,354,131 
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adjustment of the delicate balance of conflicting professional 
obligations. 
Psychiatrists should remember that all that is expected of them, 
in this as in other areas of tort liability, is that they conduct their 
practice with due care and in conformity with the standards of 
their profession. Some psychiatrists may even find Tarasoff a spur 
to more innovative and honest forms of therapy. But the negative 
potential-the temptation Tarasoff may pose for psychiatrists to 
resolve doubtful situations in favor of self-protection-suggests 
how problematic it is to impose professional standards of practice 
from outside the profession. As professionals in many fields are 
finding to their dismay, failure to resolve their role conflicts and to 
grapple with the limits of their expertise eventually invites regula- 
tion by outsiders who are less sensitive to the profession's special 
problems and less knowledgeable about them. Tarasoff exemplifies 
this phenomenon. 
This paper opened with the suggestion that further development 
of the Tarasoff rule is not necessarily inexorable, and that if psy- 
chiatrists were to divest themselves of some of their "powers," par- 
ticularly of their claimed ability to predict future "dangerousness," 
the rule might be subject to judicial revision or legislative repeal. If 
psychiatrists en masse refused to render opinions of "dangerous- 
ness" during their testimony in commitment proceedings and at  
death-penalty trials, it is hard to see how the Tarasoff rationale 
could survive.221 However, this problem cannot be solved wholly 
Cal. Rptr. 14, 34 (1976) (Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
12' The potential efficacy and the pitfalls of such an approach are both manifest in the 
decision in Teasley v. United States, 662 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1980), granting summary judg- 
ment in favor of employees of St. Elizabeth's Hospital. The plaintiff was robbed, raped, and 
sodomized by a former patient three weeks after his release from the hospital. She claimed 
that the hospital had negligently failed to produce evidence a t  a civil commitment proceed- 
ing which would have established the patient's dangerousness and resulted in his being kept 
in the hospital. The record revealed that the clinical psychologist and ward administrator 
who testified a t  the hearing refused to  say whether the patient was dangerous or not, indi- 
cating (in appropriate interactionist fashion) that that would depend upon whether he took 
his medication, his home situation, etc. The court found that since there was no basis for a 
"prediction to a mathematical certainty" and since the only duty of the expert witness is to 
disclose the facts that tend to support or negate the expert opinion, the defendant Hospital 
and its agents could not be held liable. Id. a t  791-92. Plaintiff Teasley, of course, may have 
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through the unilateral action of psychiatrists. Lawyers and judges 
must do their part by learning to challenge psychiatrists who con- 
tinue to make such claims and by encouraging psychiatrists who 
resist the pressure to do so. In trying to clarify the basis for the 
imposition of Tarasoff liability on psychiatrists, I hope to have 
somewhat advanced that collaborative process. 
wished that one of the old-fashioned, danger-predicting doctors of yore had testified at that 
hearing. Following a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, the former patient was success- 
fully committed to St. Elizabeth's. 
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